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PREEMPTING FOOD SAFETY: AN EXAMINATION OF
USDA RULEMAKING AND ITS E. COLI 0157:H7 POLICY




From early times, people have relied on the skill and care of
others to catch, grow, gather, preserve, prepare, and provide
much of the food and drink indispensable to survival. Whether
paid for with a beaver pelt, a copper coin, or a modern dollar,
food has always been the single most important product bought
and sold by human beings .... Because pure food is necessary to
survival, rendering most persons extraordinarily dependent for
their health, safety, and very lives on the care and skill of food
providers, the rules that govern liability for selling defective food
and drink have long stood apart from those concerning other
types of products.'
* Denis Stearns is a principal at Marler Clark, LLP, a Seattle-based law firm
that, for over eight years, has focused its practice on the representation of persons
injured in foodborne illness outbreaks or other pathogen-created unsafe conditions.
For more information, please see http://ww.marlerclark.com. Marler Clark
represented several plaintiffs in the Sizzler outbreak litigation discussed in this
article, and principals of the firm have previously represented parties on both sides
of the litigation arising from the Jack in the Box outbreak. The views expressed in
the Article are solely the Author's own and are not made on behalf of his law firm or
on behalf of any former or current client.
1. The correct case-name citation, according to THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM
SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005), Rule
10.2.1(a), would be Estate of Kriefall ex rel. Kriefall v. Sizzler USA Franchise, Inc.
Because Sizzler USA was aligned with the interests of the plaintiffs on appeal, and
for sake of emphasis, the case will be cited throughout as Estate of Kriefall ex rel.
Kriefall v. Excel.
2. David G. Owen, Manufacturing Defects, 53 S.C. L. REv. 851, 884 (2002).
Summarizing the law as it relates to manufacturing defects, Professor Owen reminds
us that the origin of the rules of product liability are in defective food and drink
cases, concluding that: "Responsibility for manufacturing defects is the most
fundamental obligation of product manufacturers. The law governing production
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Before the lawsuit levy broke and its alleged fraud on the public
revealed, the cigarette industry must have been the envy of
consumer product manufacturers everywhere. The cigarette
industry offered a product that caused near-incalculable harm to
generations of its users, but for decades cigarette manufacturers
enjoyed immunity from all forms of product liability claims.'
Examining the strategy of the cigarette industry, the meat industry
appears intent on using the authority of the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) to promulgate rules pursuant to
the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA)4 and its stamp of inspection5
to preempt state tort or product liability claims, and thus gain
immunity from liability for the manufacture or sale of many kinds of
unsafe meat.6
errors is now quite settled, and it remains the first pillar of modern products liability
law." Id. at 905.
3. M. Siegel et al., Preemption in Tobacco Control. Review of an Emerging Public
Health Problem, 278 J. AM. MED. ASS'N, Sept. 10, 1997, (No. 10) at 860-63
(concluding that preemption of state and local tobacco regulations is an important
strategy that undermines the public health and arguing that preventing the
enactment of new preemption laws and repealing existing ones should become a
public health priority). See also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 531
(1992) (applying federal preemption doctrine to a product liability case and holding
that certain state law failure-to-warn claims arising out of the sale of cigarettes were
preempted by state law).
4. 21 U.S.C. §§ 601- 695 (2000).
5. 21 U.S.C. § 606 (2000) (declaring that "inspectors shall mark, stamp, tag, or
label as 'Inspected and passed' all such products found to be not adulterated; and
said inspectors shall label, mark, stamp, or tag as 'Inspected and condemned' all
such products found adulterated").
6. Here and throughout this article, the term "unsafe meat" will be used to
describe meat that causes injury to a person as a proximate result of it being
contaminated with a pathogen. It should also be noted that the term
"contaminated" is to be distinguished from "adulterated." As typically used, the
term "contaminated" is legally neutral; it describes a product that has a pathogen or
foreign substance in or on it. In contrast, the term "adulterated" is used when the
contamination involves an "adulterant," as defined by statute. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.
§ 601 (m)(1) (defining "adulterated" as "bear[ing] or contain[ing] any poisonous or
deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health"). Cf. Supreme Beef
Processors, Inc. v. USDA, 275 F.3d 432, 438-39 (5th Cir. 2001) (enjoining FSIS's use
of Salmonella performance standards, noting that since 1974, Salmonella has not
been deemed an adulterant per se when present in or on meat and poultry); but see
Blake B. Johnson, The Supreme Beef Case: An Opportunity to Rethink Federal Food Safety
Regulation, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 159, 174 (2004) (concluding, without noting
the irony, that "it would appear that meat packing associations and their contingent
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A glimpse of this strategy can be found in the approach taken by
the Excel Corporation in a case arising from an outbreak of E. coli
0157:H7 infections linked by a health department investigation of
two Sizzler restaurants in the area of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.7 In that
case, Excel, one of several defendants in the case, successfully moved
for summary judgment dismissal of all state tort claims against it on
the grounds that the claims were preempted by FMIA. s The grant of
summary judgment was reversed by a decision of the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals in Estate of Kriefall ex rel. Kriefall v. Excel.9 Excel
petitioned first the Wisconsin Supreme Court and then the United
States Supreme Court for appeal, but both petitions were denied."0
With the exhaustion of appeals, the decision of the Court of Appeals
became the law and provided persuasive authority against any future
attempt to use FMIA to preempt state tort law.
Notably, at all stages of the litigation-from summary judgment
to the petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court-Excel was joined and supported by briefs filed by amici
curiae representing the interests of the meat and poultry industry."
interest groups are willing to fight against regulation designed to protect the
public").
7. Wisconsin Division of Public Health, Final Report, Investigation of an Outbreak
of E. coli 0157:H7 Infection at the Layton Avenue Sizzler Restaurant, Milwaukee, WI;
July-August, 2000, (Oct. 6, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Final Report].
8. Decision on Excel Corporations [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment, In re
Consolidated E. coli 0157:H7 Cases, No. 00-CV-006503 (Milwaukee Cir. Ct. May
15, 2002) (granting summary judgment dismissing all claims).
9. 665 N.W.2d 417, 437 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that language in FMIA,
21 U.S.C. § 678, that prohibited a state from imposing requirements with respect to
the premises, facilities, and operations of a federally-inspected meat processing
facility did not preempt state tort claims based on the sale of contaminated meat).
Excel had sought to have the decision on summary judgment made in a federal
forum, removing the cases under the Federal Officers Removal Statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1442(a)(1), but this procedural stratagem failed when the U.S. District Court
granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand. See infra notes 135-37 and accompanying
text. It is commonly thought that federal courts are more receptive to preemption
arguments, thus Excel's desire for a federal forum. See David G. Owen, Federal
Preemption of Products Liability Claims, 55 S.C. L. REv. 411, 412-14 (2003) ("In
general, federal courts are more willing than state courts to find preemption.").
10. Estate of Kriefall ex rel. Kriefall v. Sizzler USA Franchise, Inc., 671 N.W.2d
849 (Wis. 2003) (denying petition for review); Excel Corp. v. Estate of Kriefall, 541
U.S. 956 (2004) (denying Excel's petition for writ of certiorari).
11. See, e.g., Memorandum of Amici Curiae In Support of Excel's Motion for
Summary Judgment, In re Consolidated E. coli 0157:H7 Cases, No. 00-CV-006503
(Milwaukee Cir. Ct. May 15, 2002) [hereinafter Amici Memorandum]. The amici
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In the brief filed in support of Excel's motion for summary
judgment, the amici described their "substantial interest" in the
litigation as follows:
Over ninety-five (95) percent of all beef, chicken, turkey, pork,
lamb and veal products sold in the United States are produced by
the members of the Amici associations. An adverse decision here
would allow states (and individual courts) to adopt differing
adulteration standards. This would create chaos for the more
than 6,000 inspected establishments and would disrupt the
Nation's food supply. 2
Given the unanimity of support provided by the Meat Industry for
Excel's legal strategy, and its position on FMIA preemption of state
tort law, Excel's efforts may be interpreted as representing the views
of the Meat Industry. In sum, Excel's position was the Meat
Industry's position; they were in this preemption fight together.
This article will use the Kriefall decision to examine USDA
rulemaking and its still-evolving E. coli 0157:H7 policy. Part II of
the article will briefly describe the development and implementation
of the USDA E. coli 0157:H7 policy as a reaction to an enormous
and widely-publicized outbreak of E. coli infections that occurred in
1993-the so-called Jack in the Box outbreak.' Following the
outbreak, E. coli 0157:H7 was declared by USDA to be an adulterant
per se according to FMIA."4 It was also at this time that the first
steps were taken by USDA to move from a "command and control"
inspection model to the current "science-based" Hazard Analysis
Critical Control Point (HACCP)"5  model."1 These actions
were the American Meat Institute (AMI), the National Chicken Council, the
National Meat Association, the National Turkey Federation, the North American
Meat Processors Association, and the Southwest Meat Association. Id. Excel is listed
as a member of AMI on its website. See AMI, at http://www.meatami.com/Content/
NavigationMenu/BuySell/AMIMemberCompanyLinks/GeneralMemC-E.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2006). See also Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d 417, 420-21 n.1 (Wis. Ct. App.
2003) (acknowledging that a "joint amici curiam brief has been filed").
12. Amici Memorandum, supra note 11, at 2. Except when reference is being
made to Excel alone, hereinafter "Meat Industry" shall be used to collectively refer
to the industry interests represented by Excel and the amici trade associations.
13. See infra Section II.B.l.
14. See Jean M. Rawson, IB10037: Meat and Poultry Inspection Issues, July 22,
1999, available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Agriculture/ag-30.cfm.
15. See id. This is an acronym (generally pronounced as "hass-sup") standing for
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Plan. For a succinct overview of the development
of the HACCP paradigm and its adoption by the Food and Drug Administration
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represented a fundamental shift in how USDA operated, and
demonstrated a renewed ability to put public interests ahead of
traditional deference to Meat Industry concerns. This deference-
best described as "agency capture" 7 -had put public safety at risk
and eroded the legitimacy of USDA food safety actions, especially its
continued reliance on an organoleptic inspection system that was
incapable of detecting dangerous microbial pathogens. 8
Section III of the article will describe and discuss the 2000
Sizzler E. coli outbreak and the resulting litigation. Focus will be
placed upon Excel's effort to use FMIA as a shield against liability
under state law. While Excel did not ultimately prevail, the history
of the litigation reveals much about what the Meat Industry appears
to believe is at stake. Notably, while enjoying considerable freedom
under the current HACCP-based regulatory scheme, Meat Industry
rhetoric continued to describe-or more accurately, exaggerate-the
extent of government control as if each inspected facility was under
(FDA) and USDA as the primary conceptual framework for food safety reform
efforts, see Michael R. Taylor, Preparing America's Safety System for the Twenty-First
Century--ho is Responsible for What When it Comes to Meeting the Food Safety Challenges
of the Consumer-Driven Global Economy? 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 13, 20-23 (1997)
(arguing that the federal government's adoption of HACCP was only a first step,
and that much remains to be done to ensure the food system's future success). The
basic reference for HACCP is not FDA or USDA, but the National Advisory
Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Food (NACMCF). See NACMCF, Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Point Principles and Application Guidelines, 61 J. FOOD
PROTECTION (No. 9) 1246-59 (1998). "Under the current structure, HACCP is a
different system at FDA and USDA." Caroline Smith DeWaal, Food Safety Inspections:
A Call for Rational Reorganization, 54 FOOD & DRUG. L.J. 453, 456 (1999) (criticizing
the FDA's HACCP program as "in effect, an industry honor system," and calling for
greater standardization and coordination among the agencies). Among the USDA
inspectors, the acronym HACCP has achieved a telling alternate meaning-"Have a
Cup of Coffee and Pray." Kerri E. Machado, Comment, "Unfit for Human
Consumption": Why American Beef is Making Us Sick, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 801, 817
(2003).
16. Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP)
Systems, 61 Fed. Reg. 38,806, 38,806-38,989 (July 25, 1996), codified at 9 C.F.R. pts.
304, 308, 310, 320, 327, 381, 416, & 417 [hereinafter HACCP Final Rule].
17. Machado, supra note 15, at 825 ("Agency capture means that the private
interests of the meatpackers have taken control over and influence regulatory
agencies.").
18. Id. at 816 (stating that "with continuing developments in science and
technology, the mere visual, tactile, and olfactory inspection of animals became
clearly outdated").
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government occupation. This exaggeration forms the basis of the
Meat Industry's preemption argument.
Section IV of the article argues against regulatory preemption of
state tort claims, like that sought in Kriefall. The article will suggest
that in the absence of civil lawsuits that force meat processors to bear
the cost of the injuries caused by their unsafe and mismanufactured
products, regulatory compliance will be the primary and less
effective incentive for food safety innovation and investment. USDA
should therefore make clear that unless and until Congress expressly
decides otherwise, USDA does not intend for its regulations to
preempt state law tort claims premised on an alleged defect in a
meat product. 9 Only a policy against preemption will create
sufficient additional incentives for the Meat Industry to continue to
invest in further food safety innovations beyond that which is
required by USDA.
The article will conclude by contending that the USDA's E. coli
O157:H7 policy should be one of zero-tolerance on all meat and
poultry products. By failing to take into account common food-
handling practices, and the substantial risk of cross-contamination
between raw meat and other food items intended for immediate
consumption, USDA endangers the public by allowing the Meat
Industry to distribute intact meat contaminated with E. coli
0157:H7. Having declared E. coli 0157:H7 as an adulterant per se
based upon "the low infectious dose [it] associated with foodborne
disease outbreaks and the very severe consequences of an E. coli
19. A detailed discussion of how courts should decide the issue of preemption is
beyond the scope of this article. It should be emphasized, however, that the
continuing chaos of preemption jurisprudence is an important additional reason for
an agency to be cognizant that its own failure to speak clearly on the issue of
preemption will only add to the existing chaos. See Owen, supra note 9, at 412-13
and nn.3-11 (2003) (concluding that the doctrine of federal preemption "continues
to wallow in a state of utter chaos" and noting that other commentators agree). Also
beyond the scope of this Article is the question of whether, how, or when agency-
action should result in the preemption of state tort claims. For an excellent
discussion of this question, see David A. Herrman, To Delegate or Not to Delegate-
That is Preemption: The Lack of Political Accountability in Administrative Preemption Defies
Federalism Constraints on Government Power, 28 PAC. L.J. 1157, 1190-97 (1997)
(pointing out that the main reason administrative preemption is able to avoid
federalism restraints is because Congress blurs its own responsibilities for
controversial lawmaking by delegating this responsibility away).
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0157:H7 infection, °2 0 the Agency should not accede to the Meat
Industry's efforts to create a trace-tolerance level for the pathogen.
In order to meet the goal of FMIA to protect the consuming public,
a zero-tolerance policy for E. coli 0157:H7 should be mandated.
II. THE USDAE. COLI 0157:H7 POLICY: FROM REACTION TO
RETRENCHMENT
The development and implementation of the Agency's E. coli
0157:H7 policy continues to evolve, driven by the demands of the
public for safe meat, but ultimately shaped by meat industry's
influence and resistance to regulation and pathogen-testing. 21 The
starting point for any discussion of this policy must begin with the
unique dangers posed to the public-especially children-by this
pathogen.
A. E. coli 0157:H7: A Decidedly Deadly Pathogen
E. coli 0157:H7 is one of hundreds of strains of the bacterium
Escherichia coli.2 2 Most strains of E. coli are harmless and live in the
intestines of healthy humans and animals. 23 The E. coli bacterium is
among the most extensively studied microorganisms. 4  The
combination of letters and numbers in the name of the E. coli
0157:H7 refers to the specific markers found on its surface and
20. Beef Products Contaminated with Escherichia coli 0157:H7, 64 Fed. Reg. 2803
(Jan. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Non-Intact Meat Policy Statement].
21. See generally MARION NESTLE, SAFE FOOD: BACTERIA, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND
BIOTERRORISM 62-85 (2003) (describing the twenty years of consistent and often
successful efforts to block regulations that might adversely affect the meat industry's
commercial interests, the denial of responsibility for outbreaks of foodborne illness,
and the invocation of science as a means to prevent unwanted oversight).
22. E. coli bacteria were discovered in the human colon in 1885 by German
bacteriologist Theodor Escherich. Peter Feng, Stephen D. Weagant, & Michael A.
Grant, Enumeration of Escherichia coli and the Coliform Bacteria, in BACTERIOLOGICAL
ANALYTICAL MANUAL (8th ed. 2002), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-ebam/
bam-4.html. Dr. Escherich also showed that certain strains of the bacteria were
responsible for infant diarrhea and gastroenteritis, an important public health
discovery. Id. Although the bacteria were initially called Bacterium coli, the name
was later changed to Escherichia coli to honor its discoverer. Id.
23. NESTLE, supra note 21, at 40-41.
24. JAMES M. JAY, MODERN FOOD MICROBIOLOGY 21 (Aspen Publishers, Inc. 6th
ed. 2000) ("This is dearly the most widely studied genus of all bacteria.").
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distinguishes it from other types of E. coli.25 The testing performed
to distinguish E. coli 0157:H7 from its other E. coli counterparts is
referred to as serotyping." Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis
(PFGE),27 sometimes also referred to as genetic fingerprinting, is
used to compare E. coli 0157:H7 isolates to determine whether the
strains are distinguishable."
E. coli 0157:H7 was first recognized as a pathogen in 1982
during an investigation into an outbreak of hemorrhagic colitis
29
associated with consumption of hamburgers from a fast food
restaurant. 30  Retrospective examination of more than 3,000 E. coli
cultures obtained between 1973 and 1982 found only one isolation
with serotype 0157:H7, and this culture pertained to a 1975 case."'
25. Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), Escherichia coli 0157:H7, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/
dbmd/diseaseinfo/escherichiacolig.htm.
26. Beth B. Bell et al., A Multistate Outbreak of Escherichia coli 0157:H7-Associated
Bloody Diarrhea and Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome from Hamburgers: The Washington
Experience, 272J. AM. MED. ASS'N (No. 17) 1349, 1350 (Nov. 2, 1994) (describing the
multiple step testing process used to confirm, during a 1993 outbreak, that the
implicated bacteria were E. coli 0157:H7).
27. See JAY, supra note 24, at 220-21 (describing in brief the PFGE testing
process).
28. See id. Through PFGE testing, isolates obtained from the stool cultures of
probable outbreak cases can be compared to the genetic fingerprint of the outbreak
strain, confirming that the person was in fact part of the outbreak. Bell et al., supra
note 26, at 1351-52. Because PFGE testing soon proved to be such a powerful
outbreak investigation tool, PulseNet, a national database of PFGE test results was
created. Bala Swaminathan et al., PulseNet: The Molecular Subtyping Network for
Foodborne Bacterial Disease Surveillance, United States, 7 EMERGING INFECT. Dis. (No. 3)
382, 382-89 (May-June 2001) (recounting the history of PulseNet and its
effectiveness in outbreak investigation).
29. "[A] type of gastroenteritis in which certain strains of the bacterium
Escherichia coli (E. coli) infect the large intestine and produce a toxin that causes
bloody diarrhea and other serious complications." MERCK MANUAL ONLINE
MEDICAL LIBRARY, Hemorrhagic Colitis, at http:/www.merck.com/mmhe/secO9/ch122/
ch 122b.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
30. Lee W. Riley et al., Hemorrhagic Colitis Associated with a Rare Escherichia coli
Seroype, 308 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 681, 684-85 (1983) (describing investigation of two
outbreaks affecting at least forty-seven people in Oregon and Michigan both linked
to apparently undercooked ground beef); Chinyu Su & Lawrence J. Brandt,
Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Infection in Humans, 123 ANNALS INTERN. MED. (Issue 9),
698, 698-707 (1995) (describing the epidemiology of the bacteria, including an
account of its initial discovery).
31. Riley et al., supra note 30 at 684-85. See also Patricia M. Griffin & Robert V.
Tauxe, The Epidemiology of Infections Caused by Escherichia coli 0157:H7, Other Entero-
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In the ten years that followed, approximately thirty outbreaks were
recorded in the United States. 2 However, this statistic is somewhat
misleading because an E. coli 0157:H7 infection did not become a
reportable disease in any state until 1987 when Washington became
the first state to mandate its reporting." As a result, only the most
geographically concentrated outbreak of the deadly pathogen would
have garnered enough notice to prompt further investigation.3 4
The virulence of E. coli 0157:H7 is a result of its ability to
produce Shiga-like toxins.33 It was theorized that generic E. coli
acquired this deadly ability to produce Shiga-like toxins through
horizontal transfer of virulence genes from the Shigella bacteria. 6
Genome sequencing of E. coli 0157:H7 has since confirmed that
gene transfer did in fact occur, and the evolution of even more
virulent forms of bacteria is likely to continue to occur.3 7 CDC has
hemorrhagic E. coli, and the Associated Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome, 13 EPIDEMIOLOGIC
REVS. 60, 73 (1991).
32. Peter Feng, Escherichia coli Serotype 0157:H7: Novel Vehicles of Infection and
Emergence of Phenotypic Variants, 1 EMERGING INFECT. DIS. (No. 2), 47, 47 (Apr.-Jun.
1995) (noting that, despite these earlier outbreaks, the bacteria did not receive any
considerable attention until ten years later when an outbreak occurred in 1993 that
involved four deaths and over 700 infected people). See discussion infra at Section
II.B.
33. William E. Keene et al., A Swimming-Associated Outbreak of Hemorrhagic Colitis
Caused by Escherichia coli 0157:H7 and Shigella Sonnei, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 579
(Sept. 1, 1994). See also Stephen M. Ostroff, John M. Kobayashi & Jay H. Lewis,
Infections with Escherichia coli 0157:117 in Washington State: The First Year of Statewide
Disease Surveillance, 262 J. AM. MED. Ass'N (No. 3) 355, 355 (July. 21, 1989) ("It was
anticipated that the reporting requirement would stimulate practitioners and
laboratories to screen for the organism.").
34. See Keene et al., supra note 33, at 583 ("With cases scattered over four
counties, the outbreak would probably have gone unnoticed had the cases not been
routinely reported to public health agencies and investigated by them."). With
improved surveillance, mandatory reporting in forty-eight states, and the broad
recognition by public health officials that E. coli 0157:H7 was an important and
threatening pathogen, there was a total of 350 reported outbreaks from 1982-2002.
Josefa M. Rangel et al., Epidemiology of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Outbreaks, United
States, 1982-2002, 11 EMERGING INFECT. DIs. (No. 4) 603, 604 (Apr. 2005).
35. See Griffin & Tauxe, supra note 31, at 61-62 (noting that the nomenclature
came about because of the resemblance to toxins produced by Shigella dysenteriae).
36. See id. at 62 (using the more technical term "phage-mediated transfer").
37. Nicole T. Perna et al., Genome Sequence of Enterohaemorrhagic Escherichia coli
0157:H7, 409 NATURE 529-30 (Jan. 25, 2001) (finding that E. coli 0157:H7 has
1,387 genes not found in non-pathogenic E. coli). See also Robert V. Tauxe,
Emerging Foodborne Diseases: An Evolving Public Health Challenge, 3 EMERGING INFECT.
Dis. 425 (Oct.-Dec. 1997) (arguing that the epidemiology of foodborne disease will
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emphasized the prospect of emerging pathogens as a significant
public health threat for some time.38
Foods of a bovine origin are the most common cause of both
outbreaks and sporadic cases of E. coli 0157:H7 infections. 39 Surveys
performed on feed lots have demonstrated that cattle may become
infected with E. coli 0157:1H7 through close contact and in muddy
conditions.4" The prevalence of E. coli 0157:H7 among cattle in
feed lots can reach magnitudes of 63-100% of the lot, especially
during the summer.4' The prevalence of E. coli 0157:H7 in the
summer is a significant public safety risk.4"
According to a recent study, an "estimated 73,480 illnesses due
to E. coli 0157 infection occur each year in the United States,
leading to an estimated 2,168 hospitalizations and sixty-one
deaths.,4 3 The hemorrhagic colitis caused by E. coli 0157:H7 is
characterized by severe abdominal cramps, bloody stool, but
sometimes little or no fever.44 The typical incubation period, the
time from exposure to the onset of symptoms, is reported as three to
eight days.45 Infection can occur in people of any age but is most
continue to change, requiring increased collaboration of regulatory agencies and
meat industry, and the strengthening of surveillance and research efforts).
38. Tauxe, supra note 37, at 427 ("After [fifteen] years of research, we know a
great deal about infections with E. coli 0157:H7, but we still do not know how best
to treat the infection, nor how the cattle (the principal source of infection for
humans) themselves become infected."). FSIS failed to respond to the problem of
microbial pathogens in the ten years after the 1982 E. coli 0157:H7 outbreak even
though a 1985 report by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that the
Agency's organoleptic inspection methods were inadequate to detect pathogens like
E. coli 0157:H7. See General Accounting Office, Food Safety: Risk-Based Inspection
and Microbial Monitoring Needed for Meat and Poultry, GAO-94-1 10, at 5.
39. CDC, Multistate Outbreak of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Infections Associated With
Eating Ground Beef-United States, June-July 2002, 51 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WKLY REP. (No. 29) 637, 638 (July 26, 2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtml/mm5129al.htm [hereinafter CDC].
40. Id. See also NESTLE, supra note 21, at 44-45 ("Animals from many locations
arrive at the slaughterhouse together and remain in close contact until killed; their
carcasses remain in close contact until processed. Contact alone favors the spread of
pathogens.").
41. CDC, supra note 39, at 638.
42. See id.
43. Rangel et al., supra note 34, at 603.
44. Griffin & Tauxe, supra note 31, at 63
45. Robert V. Tauxe et al., Foodborne Disease, in MANDELL, DOUGLAS & BENNETT'S
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE 1150, 1152 (5th ed. 2000). See also
PROCEDURES TO INVESTIGATE FOODBORNE ILLNESS 107 (IAFP 5th ed. 1999)
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common in children. 6 The duration of an uncomplicated illness can
range from one to twelve days. 7 In reported outbreaks, the rate of
death is 0-2%, with rates running as high as 16-35% in outbreaks
involving the elderly.48
E. coli 0157:H7 infections can lead to a severe, life-threatening
complication called hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS).49  HUS
accounts for the majority of the acute and chronic illnesses and
deaths caused by the bacteria.5" HUS occurs in 2-7% of victims,
primarily children, with an onset of five to ten days after diarrhea
begins.5  It is the most common cause of renal failure in children. 2
Approximately half of the children who suffer HUS require dialysis,
and at least five percent of those who survive have long term renal
impairment.5 3  The same number suffer severe brain damage.54
(identifying incubation period for E. coli 0157:H7 as "1 to 10 days, typically 2 to
5"). In the Sizzler outbreak, the mean incubation period was 4.04 days, with a range
of two to twenty-four days. Final Report, supra note 7, at 10.
46. Su & Brandt, supra note 30, at 705 (stating that "the young are most often
affected").
47. Tauxe et al., supra note 45, at 1152.
48. Id.
49. See Griffin & Tauxe, supra note 31, at 65-68. See also Rangel et al., supra note
34, at 603 (noting that HUS is characterized by the diagnostic triad of hemolytic
anemia-destruction of red blood cells, thrombocytopenia-low platelet count, and
renal injury--destruction of nephrons often leading to kidney failure).
50. Beth P. Bell et al., Predictors of Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome in Children During a
Large Outbreak of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Infections, 100 PEDIATRICS (No. 1) 1, 1
(July 1, 1997), available at http://www.pediatrics.org/cgi/content/full/100/1/el 2.
51. Tauxe et al., supra note 45, at 1152. See also Nasia Safdar et al., Risk of
Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome After Treatment of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Enteritis: A
Meta-analysis, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS'N (No. 8) 996, 996 (Aug. 28, 2002) (stating that
"[E. coli] serotype 0157:H7 enteric infection has been recognized as the most
common cause of HUS in the United States, with 6% of patients developing HUS
within [two] to [fourteen] days of onset of diarrhea"); Amit X. Garg et al., Long-Term
Renal Prognosis of Diarrhea-Associated Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome: A Systematic Review,
Meta-analysis, and Meta-regression, 290 J. AM. MED. AsS'N (No. 10) 1360, 1360 (Sept.
10, 2003) ("Ninety percent of childhood cases of HUS are .. due to Shiga toxin-
producing Escherichia coli").
52. Su & Brandt, supra note 30, at 700.
53. Craig S. Wong et al., The Risk of Hemolytic-Uremic Syndrome After Antibiotic
Treatment of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Infections, 26 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1930 (June 29,
2000), available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/short/342/26/1930 (conclud-
ing that administration of antibiotics to children with E. coli 0157:H7 appeared to
put them at higher risk for developing HUS).
54. Richard L. Siegler, Postdiarrheal Shiga Toxin-Mediated Hemolytic Uremic
Syndrome, 290J. AM. MED. ASs'N (No. 10) 1379, 1379 (Sept. 10, 2003).
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While rare, serious injury to the pancreas can also occur and may
result in death or the development of diabetes. 5 Currently, no cure
exists for HUS.56 Tragically, as the parents of Brianna Kriefall can
attest, many children with HUS die. 7
The low infectious dose, coupled with the difficulty of combating
the bacteria, make E. coli 0157:H7 truly and decidedly deadly.5"
Unlike Salmonella, for example, which usually requires something
approximating an "egregious food handling errors," E. coli 0157:H7
found slightly undercooked in ground beef can result in infection. 9
55. Pierre Robitaille et al., Pancreatic Injury in the Hemolytic-Uremic Syndrome, 11
PEDIATRIC NEPHROLOGY 631, 632 (1997) (stating that "mild pancreas involvement in
the acute phase of HUS can be frequent").
56. Nasia Safdar et al., Risk of Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome After Antibiotic Treatment
of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Enteritis, 8 J. Am. MED. ASS'N 996 (Aug. 28, 2002); see
also Siegler, supra note 54, at 1379 ("There are no treatments of proven value, and
care during the acute phase of the illness, which is merely supportive, has not
changed substantially during the past [thirty] years.").
57. Su & Brandt, supra note 30, at 700 (stating that "the mortality rate is 5
tolO%"); see also Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 421 ("[T]hiee-year-old Brianna Kriefall died
from eating food that everyone party to this appeal . . . recognize[s] was cross-
contaminated by E. coli 0157:H7 bacteria from meat sold by Excel."). To gain
insight into the impact of HUS on the parents of children who have died from an E.
coli 0157:H7 infection, read the speeches and testimony that can be found at the
website for Safe Tables Our Priority (STOP), a non-profit grassroots organization
devoted to advocacy of foodborne illness prevention through the public, media,
government, and the scientific community, at http://www.safetables.org/
Policy_&_Outreach/PublicComments/index.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
58. Griffin & Tauxe, supra note 31, at 72 ("The general patterns of transmission
in these outbreaks suggest that the infectious dose is low."); V. K. Juneja et al.,
Thermal Destruction of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 in Hamburger, 60 J. FOOD
PROTECTION. (vol. 10). 1163-66 (1997) (demonstrating that, if hamburger does not
get to 1301F, there is no destruction, and at 140'F, there is only a 2-log reduction of
E. Coli).
59. Griffin & Tauxe, supra note 31, at 72 (noting that, as a result, "fewer bacteria
are needed to cause illness than for outbreaks of salmonellosis"); NESTLE, supra note
21, at 41 ("Foods containing E. coli 0157:H7 must be cooked at temperatures high
enough to kill all of them.") (emphasis in original). The use of the term
"undercooked" should be recognized as its tautology-i.e., undercooked means
cooking food leaving enough bacteria to survive and to cause infection. While
"undercooked" can imply negligence on the part of the person preparing the
ground beef, especially as the term is used by the Meat Industry, this implication
ignores the complexity of the heat destruction of this bacteria in a non-homogenous
medium like ground beef. For example, after telling cooks for years to use color as
an indicator of doneness, in June 1997, USDA issued a press release retracting its
previous advice and recommended that a thermometer should be used to ensure
"thorough" cooking. See FSIS Technical Publication, Color of Cooked Ground Beef as it
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As few as twenty organisms have been said to be sufficient to infect a
person and possibly even kill them."0 And unlike generic E. coli, the
0157:H7 serotype multiplies at temperatures up to I1 F sustains
heat, resists drying, and can survive short exposures to acidic
environments.6'
To further an already dangerous threat, E. coli 0157:H7
bacteria are easily transmitted by person-to-person contact.62  A
serious risk of cross-contamination between raw meat, ready-to-eat
(RTE),6" and raw vegetables and fruits exists, including the
watermelons in the Sizzler outbreak.64 Indeed, a primary criticism of
USDA is the fact that the Agency has consistently failed to focus
Relates to Doneness, available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/pubs/colortech.htm (citing
the studies that prompted the changed recommendation). The USDA's current
recommendations are still not without some learned and well-respected critics. See,
e.g., 0. Peter Snyder Jr., The Dangerous Bi-Metallic Coil Thermometer, available at
http://www.hi-tm.com/ Documents200l/hamburger-temp.pdf ("USDA-recommend-
ed bimetallic coil thermometer is an inaccurate, awkward, and complicated device
for measuring the temperature of the highly contaminated, government-inspected
and approved, raw foods that cooks must pasteurize.").
60. Patricia M. Griffin et al., Large Outbreak of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Infections
in the Western United States: The Big Picture, in RECENT ADVANCES IN VEROCYTOTOXIN-
PRODUCING ESCHERICHIA COLI INFECTIONS, at 7 (M.A. Karmali & A. G. Goglio eds.
1994) ("The most probable number of E. coli 0157:H7 was less than [twenty]
organisms per gram."). There is some inconsistency with regard to the reported
infectious dose. Compare Chryssa V. Deliganis, Death by Apple Juice: The Problem of
Foodborne Illness, the Regulatory Response, and Further Suggestions for Reform, 53 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 681, 683 (1998) (stating it can be "as few as ten") with NESTLE, supra
note 21, at 41 (stating it can be "less than 50"). Regardless of these inconsistencies,
everyone agrees that the infectious dose is, as Dr. Nestle has put it, "a miniscule
number in bacterial terms." Id.
61. NESTLE, supra note 21, at 41.
62. Griffin & Tauxe, supra note 31, at 72. "The apparent ease of person-to-
person transmission . . . is reminiscent of Shigella, an organism that can be
transmitted by exposure to extremely few organisms." Id. As a result, outbreaks in
places like daycare centers have proven relatively common. Rangel et al., supra note
34, at 605-06 (finding that 80% of the 50 reported person-to-person outbreaks from
1982-2002 occurred in daycare centers).
63. A RTE product is a product that is in a form that is edible without additional
preparation and is not required to bear a safe-handling instruction. See 9 C.F.R. §
430.1 (2005).
64. Final Report, supra note 7, at 14 (concluding that "cross-contamination of
fresh watermelon with raw meat product was the mechanism by which the vehicle
became contaminated, and the raw sirloin tri-tips were the source of E. coli 0157:H7
organisms in this outbreak"). Because litigation is still pending, it should be noted
that Excel continues to deny that this conclusion as to causation is correct.
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upon the risks of cross-contamination versus improper cooking. 5
With E. coli 0157:H7, ultimately no real margin of error exists and
the cost of error can be death.
B. Origins of the USDA's E. coli 0157:H7 Policy:
Reactionary Rulemaking
The history of food safety legislation and rulemaking in the
United States is largely one of reaction. The first laws were
prompted by the reaction to Upton Sinclair's The Jungle and its
exposure of filthy conditions and practices in the meat-packing
industry.66 Since then, little has changed. As one commentator has
aptly stated, "[t]he Jungle tipped off a century of charlatanism,
65. See, e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, Escherichia coli 0157:H7 in Ground
Beef: Review of a Draft Risk Assessment, Executive Summary, at 7 (noting that the lack
of data concerning the impact of cross-contamination of E. coli 0157:H7 during
food preparation was a flaw in the Agency's risk-assessment), available at
http:/Avww.nap.edu/books/0309086272/html/7.
66. NESTLE, supra note 21, at 50-51 (stating that "complacency ended abruptly in
1906 when Upton Sinclair published his dramatic expos6 of the meat industry");
Machado, supra note 15, at 802 (noting, somewhat hyperbolically, like much of the
article that The Jungle "propelled an investigation.., to quell public fears along with
the mass hysteria that resulted"); Sharlene W. Lassiter, From Hoof to Hamburger: The
Fiction of a Safe Meat Supply, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 411, 446-47 (1997) (stating that
The Jungle "graphically illustrated the unsanitary conditions of the meat packing
industry . . . ultimately inspirting] Congress to enact legislation to provide for
independent inspection of packing plants and slaughterhouses"); Roger I. Roots,
Other Rising Legal Issues: A Muckraker's Aftermath: The Jungle of Meat-Packing
Regulations After a Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2413, 2420 (2001) ("Upon the
precedent established by Sinclair's novel, federal inspection controls have ebbed
and flowed along with periodic public outrages."); Delilah D. Schuller, Pathogen
Reduction Through "HACCP" Systems: Is Overhaul of the Meat Inspection System All It's
Cut Out to Be? 8 S.J. AGRI. L. REV. 77, 79 (1998) ("The expose was the catalyst for the
first federal meat industry reforms."); Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer,
Organizing Federal Food Safety Regulation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 61, 79 (2000) ("The
publication of Upton Sinclair's The Jungle helped persuade President Theodore
Roosevelt to support, and Congress to pass the [Pure Food and Drug Act] and the
[Meat Inspection Act] on the same day in 1906."); Neil D. Fortin, The Hang-Up with
HACCP: The Resistance to Translating Science into Food Safety Law, 58 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 565, 584 (2003) ("The modern U.S. system of national food law began with
enactments in Theodore Roosevelt's administration when public outrage vented on
the meat industry after publication of Upton Sinclair's The Jungle."); Dion Casey,
Comment, Agency Capture: The USDA's Struggle to Pass Food Safety Regulations, 7 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 142, 143 (1998) ("The Jungle ... sparked a public outcry which
ultimately led to the passing of the Federal Meat Inspection Act.").
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heavy-handed punditry, and political patronage in federal meat
regulation. Upon the precedent established by Sinclair's novel,
federal inspection controls have ebbed and flowed along with
periodic public outrages."67 As a consequence, the "federal regula-
tory system for food safety did not emerge from a comprehensive
design but rather evolved piecemeal, typically in response to
particular health threats or economic crises."6 The end result has
been a federal food safety system that has been described as
"breathtaking in its irrationality."69
1. The 1992-1993 Multistate E. coli 0157:H7 Outbreak: Dying
for Change
One instance of a particular health threat sparking public
outrage is the multi-state outbreak of E. coli 0157:H7 infections that
occurred from November 15, 1992 through February 28, 1993.70
67. Roots, supra note 66, at 2420.
68. Statement of Robert A. Robinson, Managing Director, Natural Resources and
Environment, FOOD SECURITYAND SAFETY: Fundamental Changes Needed to Ensure
Safe Food: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management,
Restructuring and the District of Columbia, Committee on Governmental Affairs, GAO
Report 02-47T, at 3 (Oct. 10, 2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d0247t.pdf (remarking on the "resulting organizational and legal patchwork"). It
was argued that "creating a single food safety agency to administer a uniform, risk-
based inspection system is the most effective way for the federal government to
resolve long-standing problems . . . and ensure the safety of the nation's food
supply." Id. at 16.
69. NESTLE, supra note 21, at 55 (describing the system as "famously absurd," and
noting that it is comprised of twelve agencies housed in six cabinet-level
departments, coordination efforts governed by more than fifty inter-agency
agreements). It is not surprising then that nearly all requests for reform of the
federal food safety system advocate either the creation of a single federal food safety
agency, or some form of increased consolidation. Merrill & Francer, supra note 66,
at 66 and n.15 ("In the last fifty years, more than a dozen expert panels inside and
outside government have called for the consolidation of the federal agencies that
exercise and share food safety responsibilities."). Also not surprising is the near-
uniform pessimism that such reforms will ever occur. Id. at 163 (concluding that
consolidation is likely to remain merely an idea).
70. Update: Multistate Outbreak of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Infections from
Hamburgers-Western United States, 1992-1993, 42 MORBIDrrY AND MORTALITY WKLY
REP. (No. 14) 258 (Apr. 16, 1993), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/mm5129al.htm (summarizing the findings from an ongoing
investigation that identified a multistate outbreak resulting from consumption of
one restaurant chain) [hereinafter Update]. This outbreak is nearly always referred
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Initial reports indicated there were more than 500 laboratory-
confirmed infections and four associated deaths that occurred in
Washington, Idaho, California, and Nevada.71 The State of
Washington had made E. coli 0157:H7 infections a reportable
disease in 1987, and as a result, by 1993, most clinical laboratories
had the ability to culture stools to detect the bacteria.72
The Jack in the Box outbreak was notable in many respects, not
the least of which was the immense suffering that resulted; the
outbreak was the largest outbreak of E. coli 0157:H7 infections
reported to date. 73 Over one-quarter of the outbreak victims were
hospitalized, 7.5% developed HUS (mostly children), and four
died.74 With the benefit of only about one year of hindsight, one
high-ranking CDC official wrote:
The impact of this outbreak has been impressive. E. coli
0157:H7 has become a household word. Food safety became a
hot topic. National television and newspapers intensively covered
the outbreak and its consequences. President Clinton was shown
visiting an affected family. Parents of affected children gave
presentations before U.S. government officials and on national
television shows. And consumer groups, some newly formed
because of the outbreak, became very involved in food safety.
The impact on [USDA] has been unprecedented. It announced a
Zero Tolerance program for fecal matter on raw beef carcasses, as
to as the "Jack in the Box outbreak." See, e.g., NESTLE, supra note 21, at 74 ("The
consequences of the Jack in the Box outbreak were immediate."). The outbreak is
so-called even though the implicated hamburger patties were extensively
contaminated with E. coli 0157:H7 during processing. See Bell et al., supra note 26,
at 1352 (Nov. 2, 1994) (stating that "[a] large portion of 1 day's production of
hamburger patties was contaminated with a single strain of E. coli 0157:H7").
71. Update, supra note 70, at 258-61 (reporting that 477 persons met the case
definition in Washington, fourteen in Idaho, thirty-four in California, and fifty-eight
in Nevada, for a total of 583 cases). See also Griffin, supra note 60, at 7 ("Over 700
ill persons were reported, mostly children.").
72. Griffin et al., supra note 60 at 7-8 (noting that "this was different from the
situation in the rest of the United States ... and was important for the events that
followed").
73. Bell et al., supra note 26, at 1353. The Jack in the Box outbreak would be
surpassed three years later when approximately 10,000 people in Japan, including
over 6,000 school children, were infected by eating contaminated radish sprouts.
Yoshiyuki Watanabe et al., Factory Outbreak of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 in Japan, 5
EMERGING INFECT. Dis. (No. 3) 424, 424 (May-Jun. 1999).
74. Griffin et al., supra note 60, at 7.
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well as a Pathogen Reduction Program. It also mandated safe
handling labels for meat. It re-directed $5.7 million dollars [sic]
of funds to food safety .... USDA's new focus on public health
has been hotly contested by industry, and the final outcome is
unknown. 75 Those who had long called for an overhaul of the
meat inspection system caught the right wave of politics and
problems, and the groundwork for HACCP was put into place.76
2. E. coli 0157:H7: An Adulterant Per Se in Meat and Poultry
The fact that the Jack in the Box outbreak resulted in relatively
prompt and significant changes to the federal food safety
regulations, including the adoption of a HACCP-based meat
inspection scheme, is widely acknowledged.77 Of course, the Jack in
the Box outbreak would certainly not be the last to prompt
reactionary changes by USDA or other food safety agencies.78
75. Id. at 12. See also NESTLE, supra note 21, at 90 ("In contrast, and rather a
surprise in view of its past history, the USDA moved quickly [in the wake of the Jack
in the Box outbreak] to introduce HACCP under the more consumer-friendly
leadership appointed by President Clinton .... True to form, some meat industry
groups objected.").
76. Roderick M. Hills Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, at 17, available at http://www.law.umich.edu/
centersandprograms/olin/abstracts/discussionpapers/2003/Hills%2003007.pdf ("Like
a surfer, the policy advocate has to wait for the right wave of problems and politics
before he can move.") Mr. Hill argues, among other things, that "the best way to
[focus] Congress' attention on the question of victim compensation is to force
interest groups favoring preemption of tort claims to bear the burden of urging
preemption of those claims before Congress." Id. at 37.
77. Johnson, supra note 6, at 164 (stating that the HACCP program "followed
widespread publicity of an E. coli outbreak in 1993"); Fortin, supra note 66, at 581
(stating "it was only after public outrage and loss of consumer confidence that USDA
finally acted to reduce E. coli 0157:H7 contamination of meat products and
proposed regulations to require meat HACCP-as the [National Academy of
Science] had recommended a decade earlier"); Schuller, supra note 66, at 85 ("The
Uack in the Box] outbreak focused attention on the current meat-inspection system.
Parents, consumer groups, even members of the meat industry pushed for reform.
The government initially responded with promises of more inspectors. Ultimately,
the government, with the help of others, developed and finalized HACCP."); Casey,
supra note 66, at 148 ("It was only in the wake of this public outrage ... that the
USDA and the FSIS were finally prodded into action.").
78. See, e.g., Deliganis, supra note 60, at 693 (discussing E. coli 0157:H7 in the
context of the Odwalla outbreak, which the author familiarly describes later in the
article as "not just a story about the difficulties faced by one particular company, but
rather a wake-up call to an entire industry"); Michael T. Roberts, Mandatory Recall
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Nevertheless, at least initially, the regulatory changes prompted by
the outbreak were significant. Foremost among the changes and the
first to occur, was the USDA decision to declare E. coli 0157:H7 as
an adulterant within the meaning of FMIA. This USDA decision was
the first time a foodborne pathogen on raw product was declared an
adulterant under FMIA.79
One might reasonably assume that a declaration of such
importance might have been promulgated as a regulation, or at a
minimum be published in the Federal Register; however, this did
not occur. Instead, on September 28, 1994, FSIS Administrator,
Michael Taylor, announced that the Agency would begin treating
any raw ground beef product bearing or containing E. coli 0157:H7
to be adulterated within the meaning of FMIA. ° The announcement
was made in a speech given at the annual convention of AMI. a' On
October 11, 1994, the Agency circulated a "final draft" of a FSIS
Notice stating how the ground beef sampling and testing program
functioned as a way to detect E. coli 0157:H7.2 On October 19 that
Authority: A Sensible and Minimalist Approach to Improving Food Safety, 59 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 563, 574-76 (discussing the ConAgra outbreak and recall and the widespread
publicity and criticism that prompted calls for changes that, in characteristic
fashion, FSIS largely shrugged off); CDC, Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Outbreak Linked
to Commercially Distributed Dry-Cured Salami-Washington and California, 1994, 44
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY REP (No. 9) 157, 157-58 (Mar. 10, 1995), available
at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtm/ 00036467.htm (prompting USDA
to enact regulations to ensure the safety of shelf-stable fermented sausages); FSIS
Backgrounder, FSIS Strategies for Addressing Listeria monocytogenes, (Feb. 1999,
updated May 2000), available at http://www.fsis.usda. gov/OA/background/bklisteria
.htm (responding to Listeria outbreak in which several people died, stating that
"FSIS is concerned about the recent, nationwide outbreak of listeriosis associated
with meat and poultry products. The Agency believes this is an appropriate time to
reconsider government and industry approaches to addressing Listeria monocytogenes
in order to further reduce the risk of human illness.").
79. NESTLE, supra note 21, at 80 ("By the early 1990s, USDA officials had argued
for two decades that ... [it] did not have legal authority to set limits on microbial
contaminants in meat and poultry because pathogens like Salmonella were 'inherent'
in raw meat.").
80. Id. at 81.
81. Id.
82. FSIS NOTICE, Microbiological Testing Program for Escherichia coli in Raw
Ground Beef (Final Draft, Oct. 11, 1994) (stating that "[tlo stimulate a reduction in
the presence of [E. colil 0157:H7 in raw ground beef, FSIS will commence on
October 17, 1994, a microbiological testing program for E. coli 0157:H7") (on file
with author). See also E-mail from from Robert A. LaBudde, President of Least Cost
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same year, FSIS issued a "Constituent Alert" documenting Mr.
Taylor's previous declaration concerning E. coli 0157:H7 as an
adulterant per se.8" In addition to declaring that E. coli 0157:H7 is
an adulterant, the FSIS Notice also announced that it was going
forward with a testing program for E. coli 0157:H7 in ground
beef.84 As described by the court called upon to rule on the Agency's
authority to institute the testing program:
The notice announced that the FSIS would collect and test five
thousand (5,000) samples of raw ground beef from federally-
inspected establishments and retail stores. Any of these samples
testing positive for the pathogen E. coli would be treated as
"adulterated" under [FMIA] and referred to FSIS headquarters
for regulatory action. Prior to this announcement, the USDA had
treated pathogen-contaminated meat as unadulterated under the
FMIA.s8
Of course, in the absence of testing, the only way that USDA had an
opportunity to learn about meat contamination was when an
outbreak occurred.
While the announced testing program was specific to ground
beef, it has never been clear that the agency considered E. coli
0157:H7 to be an adulterant only in ground beef. For example, in
the HACCP Final Rule, USDA stated that "some pathogens, such as
[E. coli] 0157:H7, are so virulent that a small number of organisms
can pose a significant hazard. s6 Indeed, on that basis the agency has
determined that any amount of [E. coli] 0157:H7 will adulterate a
meat or poultry product.,8 7 It was only in its later statements that
USDA began to characterize-or, more accurately, recharacterize-
its 1994 anouncement that E. coli 0157:H7 was an adulterant per se
as having applied solely to ground beef.88
Formulations, Ltd. since 1979, to the Author (Sept. 7, 2005, 11:40 PST) (on file
with author) [hereinafter LaBudde E-mail].
83. LaBudde E-mail, supra note 82, at 1. After more than ten years of trying, the
Author has still not been able to find a copy of the Constituent Alert in question.
84. Id.
85. Texas Food Industry Ass'n v. Espy, 870 F. Supp. 143, 145 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
86. HACCP Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,835.
87. Id. at 38,835.
88. See, e.g., Non-Intact Meat Policy Statement, 64 Fed. Reg. 2803, 2803 ("In
1994, FSIS notified the public that raw ground beef products contaminated with
pathogen [E. coli] 0157:H7 are adulterated under the [FMIA]."). USDA-FSIS, White
Paper on Escherichia coli 0157:H7, Nov. 1999, Attachment to FSIS Constituent
Update, November 5, 1999, available at http://www.nasda.org/joint/ecolipaper.htm
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Once announced, the meat industry predictably filed suit
seeking a preliminary injunction to block the testing program on the
grounds that it was not promulgated through appropriate
rulemaking procedures, that it was arbitrary and capricious, and that
it exceeded the USDA's regulatory authority under the law. 9 The
court ruled that the USDA's decision to consider E. coli 0157:H7 an
adulterant was an "interpretative rule," and therefore not subject to
the requirement of formal rulemaking.9 ° The court then rejected
the arguments that the rule was arbitrary and capricious, finding
that:
There is certainly a rational basis for the USDA to conduct some
sort of testing in order to educate itself about this problem.
Furthermore, the evidence indicates that the program has been at
least partially successful in spurring industry to take greater
preventive measures. Moreover, in light of the common cooking
practices of most Americans, there is at least a rational basis for
treating E. [c]oli differently than other pathogens. Finally, the
court finds that [USDA's] changing policy is a rational response to
an emerging problem.9'
The court therefore accepted the rationale that, because ordinary
cooking temperatures could not reliably eliminate E. coli 0157:H7
from ground beef, USDA had good reason to deem the bacteria as
an adulterant and to test for their presence.9"
3. From "Command and Control" to HACCP: Shifting the
Blame
With freedom comes responsibility, and such responsibility was
placed with HACCP. The goal was to make the Meat Industry
responsible for product safety and have FSIS move away from
"command and control" to an oversight role. Such a shift of
responsibility had been tried before without much in the way of
success.93  As a result of the public uproar and media attention
("In 1994, FSIS declared that E. coli 0157:H7 is an adulterant in ground beef and
instituted a testing program for the pathogen.").
89. Texas Food Industry Ass'n, 870 F. Supp. at 145.
90. Id. at 147.
91. Id. at 148.
92. See id. at 149.
93. See Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation of Federal Regulations, 13
YALE. J. ON REG. 535 (Summer 1996) (describing how the mandatory HACCP
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caused by the Jack in the Box outbreak, HACCP offered something
different. FSIS would put in place a true science-based system to
confront and finally solve the problem of microbial pathogens.94 No
longer would "poke-and-sniff' inspection systems suffice to protect
the American public and its food supply.9" All federally-inspected
processors and slaughterhouses would be required to adopt HACCP
systems to identify potential sources of pathogen contamination and
establish procedures to prevent contamination.96 According to
USDA, "HACCP is the best system currently available for
maximizing the safety of the nation's food supply."97
Explaining the elimination of regulations that had "assign[ed]
to FSIS responsibility for the means used to produce safe food in a
sanitary environment," the Agency announced:
As part of its regulatory reform initiative, FSIS has undertaken
the conversion of current command-and-control regulations to
performance standards. Command-and-control regulations, and
the Inspection System Guide that FSIS inspectors use to enforce
those regulations, resulted from the perceived need to achieve
uniformity among federally inspected meat and poultry establish-
program proposed by FSIS was preceded by two different programs involving self-
enforcement that achieved limited, if any, success). See also NESTLE, supra note 21, at
71-72 (describing the failure of the Agency's "streamlined" discretionary inspection
program that it tried implementing from 1986-1989 before then abandoning it).
94. See 60 Fed. Reg. 6774, 6784 (Feb. 3, 1995).
95. See id.
96. HACCP Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,814 ("This final rule requires the
federally-inspected establishments implements HACCP systems to address hazards
that are reasonably likely to occur in their operations.") The publication of the
HACCP Final Rule was preceded by the Proposed Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 6774-6889
(Feb. 3, 1995). A discussion of the details of how HACCP is intended to work, and
the specifics of the HACCP Final Rule is beyond the scope of this Article, and is, in
any case, unnecessary given the more than adequate discussion of these subjects
elsewhere. See Stephen R. Crutchfield et al. Economic Research Service/USDA, An
Economic Assessment of Food Safety Regulations: the New Approach to Meat and Poultry
Inspection, at 5-8 (AER-755 1997), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/
aer755/ (situating the enactment of the HACCP Final Rule, summarizing what the
Rule requires, and stating that the "new rules represent a comprehensive strategy
on the part of FSIS to modernize the 90-year old inspection program"); Schuller,
supra note 66, at 85-91 (providing a brief but thorough review of the history of
HACCP and the requirements of the Final Rule); Fortin, supra note 66, at 566-68
(setting forth the seven HACCP principles, the development of HACCP in
conjunction with NASA and detailing the superiority of it as a food safety system).
97. HACCP Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,814. See also Fortin, supra note 66, at
565 ("HACCP... is widely recognized as the best food safety system available.").
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ments. Technological advances introduce a new imperative,
however. If establishments are to innovate, using new technolo-
gies to improve food safety, they cannot be impeded by a one-
size-fits-all regulatory system. Under contemporary conditions,
affording establishments the flexibility to make establishment-
specific decisions outweighs the advantages of uniformly
applicable rules.
98
What was thus to result was a single regulation that created a non-
uniform regulatory scheme. In effect, once implemented, HACCP
plans would be the law of a given plant, but no other.
Moreover, "[u]nder the new system, industry assumes full
responsibility for production decisions and execution." 99 And the
regulations:
represent a fundamental shift in FSIS's regulatory philosophy
from, "command and control," to performance standards, which
allow for more flexibility. Industry is being required by the
regulation to develop plans for controlling food safety hazards
that can affect their products. If the plans they design are
effective in eliminating health and safety hazards, and if the
establishment executes the plan's design properly, then the
resulting product should be safe for consumers. Instead of FSIS
determining the means by which establishments will meet their
responsibility to produce safe, wholesome, and properly labeled
products, FSIS will set performance standards that establishments
must meet. This means that FSIS will no longer be attempting to,
"inspect quality into a product." Inspection's role has become one
of regulatory oversight."°
In short, FSIS inspectors will no longer be working "shoulder-to-
shoulder" in the plant to ensure the safety and wholesomeness of the
meat there produced. Rather, the inspectors will be looking over the
shoulder of the meat industry as it tries to get it right. And the end
98. Id. at 38,808 (emphasis added). The use of the passive voice in describing the
"perceived" need for uniformity is telling in that it hides the fact that the perception
was plainly shared by the Agency and the Meat Industry. That the disavowal of this
perception was here passively described demonstrates the Agency's failure to take,
at least in part, express responsibility for the past failure of its inspection scheme.
99. Id.
100. Supenrisoy Guideline for the Pathogen Reduction!HACCP Regulatory Requirements,
at 2 (1998), at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/09/haccp/regreq98.pdf (last visited Oct. 21,
2005) [hereinafter HACCP Guidelines].
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result, of course, at least in theory, is that it is not USDA's fault if
unsafe meat makes it into distribution.
C. The Intact Meat Exception to the E. coli 0157:H7 Adulteration
Standard: An Agency Apparently Recaptured
The increased focus upon E. coli 0157:H7 and meat safety
began to erode not long after it started.'0 1 As one commentator
stated, "when the outcry faded, the industries recaptured the
agencies by pressuring the courts and Congress."10 2  The Meat
Industry, for example, was able to persuade USDA to exclude intact
meat from its E. coli 0157:H7 policy, treating such meat as
unadulterated.' The resulting change in policy was, however, far
from clear.
101. NESTLE, supra note 21, at 84, 90-97 (describing the Meat Industry's ultimately
unsuccessful efforts to derail the adoption of the Final HACCP Rule, while noting
that it still managed to weaken the Rule and slow its adoption); Casey, supra note
66, at 150-54. See also Fortin, supra note 66, at 581 (stating that "the regulations
were watered down before promulgation. Moreover, the meatpacking industry
fought, and avoided, an effort to grant the government authority to order the recall
of tainted food .... A number of writers argued that USDA retreated from its food
safety mission in the face of [meat] industry pressure.").
102. Casey, supra note 66, at 142. See also Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier,
Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027, 1064-68 (1990) (discussing Meat
Industry capture of agency charged with regulating the Meat Industry); Peter L.
Kahn, Regulation and Simple Arithmetic: Shifting the Perspective on Tort Reform, 72 N.C.
L. REv. 1129, 1182-84 (1994) (arguing that administrative agencies have limited
resources available to properly and fully police product risks within their scope);
Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability
Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1147-48 (1988) (discussing Meat Industry control of
information needed by agency to regulate effectively hampers agency decision-
making process).
103. Non-Intact Meat Policy Statement, 64 Fed. Reg. at 2803. The Meat Industry
would no doubt disagree with any characterization of this new policy as a success,
given the "shock, disbelief, and anger" that was expressed when it was first
announced. NESTLE, supra note 21, at 103-04 (noting that "the reactions to this
proposal demonstrated that the beef industry was determined to oppose any
expansion of pathogen testing, no matter how limited or beneficial to the public").
However, the Meat Industry's subsequent embrace of the policy as being an
exemption of substantial category of meat products from USDA's E. coli 0157:H7
adulteration standards, and as a basis for federal preemption of state tort law, is but
another example of how the Meat Industry tries to make victory from defeat.
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Following Texas Food Industry v. Espy,"° USDA stated in its Non-
Intact Meat Policy Statement, published in the Federal Register on
January 19, 1999, that the Agency believes the status under FMIA of
beef products contaminated with E. coli 0157:H7 must depend on
whether there is adequate assurance that subsequent handling of the
product will result in food that is not contaminated when
consumed. 15 In its policy statement, the Agency provided no
statutory basis for Agency authority to define adulteration on a
product-specific basis. Nor did the Agency expressly state that E. coli
0157:H7 was no longer an adulterant per se. Instead, it stated that:
[USDA] believes that with the exception of beef products that are
intact cuts of muscle that are to be distributed for consumption as
intact cuts, an E. coli 0157:H7-contaminated beef product must
not be distributed until it has been processed into a ready-to-eat
product-i.e., a food product that may be consumed safely
without any further cooking or other preparation.'°6
Accordingly, based on the input it received, the Agency announced
that it would consider expanding its sampling and testing program
to include non-intact beef products or intact cuts of meat that are to
be further processed into non-intact cuts. 7
The corollary of the Agency's position was that, while it would
treat non-intact meat as "adulterated" if contaminated with E. coli
0157:H7, it would not treat intact meat as "adulterated" if it was
identically contaminated.0 ' Essentially, the Agency created an
exception to its E. coli 0157:H7 policy for an entire product-
category-intact meat. The Agency defined the category as "cuts of
muscle include steaks, roast, and other intact cuts (e.g., briskets, stew
beef, and beef 'cubes for stew', as well as thin-sliced strips of beef for
104. 870 F. Supp. 143 (finding it reasonable to treat E. coi 0157:H7 differently
than other pathogens "in light of the common cooking practices of most
Americans").
105. Non-Intact Meat Policy Statement, 64 Fed. Reg. at 2803.
106. Id. at 2804.
107. Id. ("The Agency may reconsider its sampling and testing program, as well as
the scope of products deemed adulterated, in response to any comments received
on the Agency's position regarding the application of the FMIA's adulteration
standards.").
108. Id. (stating that "such intact products that are to be distributed for
consumption as intact cuts are not deemed adulterated.").
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stir-frying) in which the meat interior remains protected from
pathogens migrating below the exterior surface."'0 9
The definition of "intact meat" is explicit in its reliance on the
deliberations of the National Advisory Committee on Micro-
biological Criteria for Foods (NACMCF)" ° and the work it did for
FDA and USDA in their joint development of the 1999 Food
Code."' One such task was to determine the "appropriate cooking
temperatures for, among other things, intact beef steaks for the
control of vegetative enteric pathogens."' 2 As stated in the Non-
Intact Meat Policy Statement regarding intact product:
Due to a low probability of pathogenic bacteria being present in
or migrating from the external surface to the interior of beef
muscle, cuts of intact muscle (steaks) should be safe if external
surfaces are exposed to temperatures sufficient to effect a cooked
color change. In addition, the cut (exposed) surfaces must
receive heat to effect a complete sear across the cut surfaces ....
The Committee's definition of "Intact Beef Steak" limited the
applicability of this conclusion to "[a] cut of whole muscle[s] that
has not been injected, mechanically tenderized, or
reconstructed."
13
Therefore, intact meat is any meat that is not non-intact, and vice
versa.
Recognizing the utility of excluding entire product-categories
from the USDA's E. coli 0157:H7 policy, the Meat Industry soon
began to press the Agency to also exclude mechanically-tenderized
meat from the policy. The Meat Industry sponsored research
intended to show the relative safety of this second category of meat
products when cooked."4
In response to meat industry lobbying, the Agency asked
NACMCF to "answer several questions with regard to E. coli
109. Id.
110. Non-Intact Meat Policy Statement, 64 Fed. Reg. at 2803.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2803-2804. See also 1999 Model Food Code, 3-201.11(E), available at
http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/fc99-3.html (defining "whole-muscle intact beef
steaks" as those "that are intended for consumption in an undercooked form
without a consumer advisory").
114. Wendy Warren, Characterization of E, coli 0157:H7 on Subprimal Beef Cuts Prior
to Mechanical Tend erization: Project Summary (Aug. 2002), at http://www.beef.org/
uDocs/E.%20coli%20Mech%20Tenderization_Warren 6 6 03.pdf (stating on title
page "Funded by America's Beef Producers") (last visited Jan. 11, 2006).
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0157:H7 in blade-tenderized, non-intact beef."' 15  For its part,
"NACMCF concluded that non-intact, blade tenderized beef steaks
could potentially contain an infective dose of E. coli 0157:H7 in
their interior."'" 6 As a result, on October 7, 2002, USDA announced
in a policy statement that:
FSIS is reviewing the NACMCF report and its draft risk
assessment for E. coli 0157:H7 in intact and non-intact (blade
tenderized) steaks and will consider NACMCF's conclusions and
the conclusions from the risk assessment with regard to the policy
announced for non-intact products in the January 19, 1999
Federal Register .... At this time, FSIS believes that the public
health hazard presented by E. coli 0157:H7 and the prevalence of
E. coli 0157:H7 in these products continues to support
application of the policy announced in the January 19, 1999,
Federal Register. There is a lack of data on industry and
consumer practices for cooking pinned, needled, and blade
tenderized steaks (e.g., grilling, oven broiling, or frying) and a
lack of data on the proportion of [meat] industry outlets and
consumers that prepare these products according to each of these
different methods. If FSIS obtains substantial and reliable data
showing that [meat] industry and consumers customarily cook
pinned, needled, and blade tenderized products in a manner that
destroys E. coli 0157:H7, FSIS would consider modifications to its
policy.., in these products," 7
As a result, the focus continued to be placed upon cooking and
nothing else. The extremely low infectious-dose made cross-
contamination as big a risk as undercooking. At least in the case of
cross-contamination risk, the Agency remained steadfast in its
position.
115. E. Coli 0157:H7 Contamination of Beef Products, 67 Fed. Reg. 62,325,
62,333 (Oct. 7, 2002).
116. Id. This conclusion two years later proved correct, in the usual tragic fashion
with this pathogen, when an outbreak of E. coli 0157:H7 infections was linked to
non-intact blade tenderized steaks. See Ellen Swanson Laine et al., Outbreak of
Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Infections Associated with Nonintact Blade-Tenderized Frozen
Steaks Sold by Door-to-Door Vendors, 68 J. FOOD PROTECrION (No. 6) 1198, 1200, 1202
(2005) (describing an outbreak in which one fifty-two year-old HUS victim was
hospitalized for twenty-five days and suffered permanent brain injury, and
concluding that the "USDA should consider reevaluating the microbiologic hazards
of technologies used in the production of nonintact steaks").
117. Id. at 62,334.
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Thus, the focus continued to be placed upon cooking and
nothing else when determining whether a category of meat products
would be deemed adulterated. The extremely low infectious-dose
made cross-contamination as big a risk as undercooking, but this was
ignored. The responsibility for meat safety was undergoing another
shift, this time from the Meat Industry to the consumer. After
having first set forth a zero-tolerance policy for this deadly
pathogen, because "any amount of [E. coli] 0157:H7 will adulterate a
meat or poultry product,""' 8 the Agency now appeared in retreat.
III. KRIEFALL V. EXCEL MEAT CORPORATION: THE BATTLE FOR
PREEMPTION BEGINS
The litigation that resulted from the Sizzler outbreak is
exemplary in two ways. First, the outbreak itself is a perfect example
of why the USDA E. coli 0157:H7 policy on intact meat is evidence
of agency capture, where "an agency moves too far toward
accommodating a single interest while moving away from its statu-
tory mission.""' 9 Second, the resulting litigation clearly demon-
strated the Meat Industry's intent to invest whatever resources
necessary to obtain an authoritative ruling that USDA regulations
and policy statements can preempt state tort claims premised on an
allegation that a meat product was unsafe and caused injury as a
result.
A. The 2000 Sizzler E. coli 0157:H7 Outbreak:
Cross-contamination Matters
The Sizzler outbreak started with an outbreak of E. coli
0157:H7 infections that occurred in the Milwaukee area six years
ago. According to the outbreak investigation report issued by the
Wisconsin Department of Health, over sixty-two confirmed cases
were linked to food eaten at a local Sizzler restaurant.1 20 Twenty-
three individuals were hospitalized, 121 including four who developed
118. HACCP Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,835.
119. See Fortin, supra note 66, at 582 (pointing out that agency capture need not
be blatant in that it "may provide a measure of public good, but regulators' care is
balanced more for the industry's benefit than for the public's").
120. See Final Report, supra note 7, at 9.
121. Id.
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HUS. 122 Tragically, one child, Brianna Kriefall died. I23 In addition
to confirmed cases, there were 551 probable cases reported, linked
by strong epidemiological evidence, and another 122 possible
cases. 124
In an attempt to explain how this huge outbreak occurred, the
State Department of Health set forth its conclusions with surprising
directness:
Based on the results of the case-control study, the test results of
the opened and intact food samples from the restaurant and the
conclusions of the restaurants inspections, it is most probable that
the watermelon was the vehicle for infection, cross-contamination
of fresh watermelon with raw meat product was the mechanism by
which the vehicle became contaminated, and the raw sirloin tri-
tips were the source of E. coli 0157:H7 organisms in this
outbreak. 1
25
An extension of the scientific conclusions, however, remains the
human element; there lies the real tragedy, and death. As the
mother of Brianna Kriefall put it, "Our daughter was a miracle child




123. See id. See also Joby Warrick, An Outbreak Waiting to Happen: Beef-Inspection
Failures Let In a Deadly Microbe, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2001, at Al (reporting that:
Wisconsin health investigators later concluded Brianna Kriefall died from
eating watermelon that Sizzler workers had inadvertently splattered with
juices from tainted sirloin tips. The meat came from a Colorado
slaughterhouse where beef repeatedly had been contaminated with feces,
[E. coli]'s favorite breeding ground. Federal inspectors had known of the
problems at the plant and had documented them dozens of times. But
ultimately they were unable to fix them.).
124. Final Report, supra note 7, at 9.
125. Id. at 14. This was not the first time that cross-contamination between raw
meat and other food items had caused an outbreak of E. coli 0157:H7 infections at a
Sizzler restaurant. See, e.g., Lisa A. Jackson et al., Where's the Beef? The Role of Cross-
Contamination in 4 Chain Restaurant Associated Outbreaks of Escherichia Coli 0157:H7
in the Pacific Northwest, 160 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2380, 2385 (Aug. 14, 2000)
(finding that "relatively subtle lapses in food-handling procedures might be
sufficient to result in an outbreak," and that "[t]hrough cross-contamination, meat
can be a source of E. coli 0157:H7 infection even if it is later cooked properly").
126. Warrick, supra note 123, at Al.
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B. The Start of Litigation
The first lawsuit was filed on August 1, 2000, naming the Sizzler
franchisor as the defendant.' 27  The complaint was amended on
August 24, 2000 to add the Excel Corporation as a defendant.128
Among its allegations, the First Amended Complaint alleged that
Excel "manufactured meat contaminated with E. coli 0157:H7, and
that this meat was used in the preparation of food at the Sizzler
restaurant . . .and was the source of the bacteria that injured the
plaintiff, Ervin Lesak, and caused his E. coli 0157:H7 infection.1 29
Based on this and other allegations, the plaintiffs asserted four state
law claims: (1) strict liability, (2) negligence per se, (3) negligence,
and (4) breach of warranty.' 0
Instead of filing an answer, Excel removed the actions to federal
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The statute was enacted
because "Congress has decided that federal officers, and indeed the
Federal Government itself, require the protection of a federal
forum."'' 3' Excel alleged that its plants were, in fact, an extension of
the federal government, that its employees were government agents,
and that removal was proper because the "amount of federal
oversight, regulation, supervision and control exerted by FSIS over
Excel is as pervasive as it is complex."'' 3 2 Excel further argued that
Congress has empowered FSIS to supervise and control meat
production facilities, while enforcing its detailed and comprehensive
regulatory scheme, to protect the health and welfare of consumers,
create uniform national standards, and to eliminate burdens to
interstate commerce. Because Excel conducts virtually all of its day-
to-day operations pursuant to the detailed supervision and control of
FSIS, plaintiffs' claims against Excel will directly interfere with the
operation of FMIA and FSIS's implementation of its corresponding
127. Complaint, Lesak v. E & B Mgmt. Co., Waukesha Inc. et al., No. 00-CV-
006360 (Aug. 1, 2000).
128. First Amended Complaint, Lesak v. Excel Corp. et al., No. 00-CV-006360 (Aug.
24, 2000).
129. Id. at 5.
130. Id. at 4-9.
131. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969). The Court also noted that,
historically, "the removal provision was an attempt to protect federal officers from
interference by hostile state courts." Id. at 405.
132. Notice of Removal, at 3, Lesak v. E & B Mgmt. Co. Waukesha, Inc. et al., No.
00-CV-006360, (Nov. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Notice of Removal].
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federal policies.133 According to Excel, as a matter of law it was
entitled to a federal forum because its operation of a USDA-
inspected meat processing facility made it "directly involved in the
implementation of federal policy."' 14 In short, according to Excel, it
was essentially a government contractor.
The United States District Court Judge Charles N. Clevert
rejected Excel's arguments, and its description of pervasive control
and direct physical supervision. The court stated, "Notwithstand-
ing Excel's representations regarding the presence of federal
officials in its plant, it does not appear that the FMIA or the FSIS
exercises the type of control or supervision justifying removal."'
3 5
The court also rejected Excel's attempt to make the possibility
of federal preemption a basis for removal. The court wrote:
Because Excel did not meet its burden in demonstrating that it
was acting under an agency or officer, the court need not decide
whether it has a colorable federal defense to the plaintiffs' claims.
A significant portion of Excel's oversized brief focuses on this
defense. That Excel might ultimately prove that plaintiffs' claims
are [preempted] does not establish that they are removable to
federal court.3
6
The court thus ruled that Excel had failed to satisfy its burden of
establishing the existence of removal jurisdiction.'37 As a result,
Excel was forced to make its preemption argument in state court-a
forum that it had wrongly assumed would be hostile to its
arguments.
C. Excel's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Opposition to It
Excel's Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment
were filed on February 22, 2002, along with a supporting
Memorandum of Law. 13 The argument Excel made was exceedingly
133. Id. at 4 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
134. See Notice of Removal, supra note 132, at 3.
135. Lesak v. E & B Mgmt. Co. Waukesha, Inc. et al., No. 00-C-1508, at 8 (E.D. Wis.
Apr. 30, 2001) (granting plaintiffs' motion to remand).
136. Id. at 11 (citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)).
137. See id.
138. Excel Corporation's Notice of Motion, Motion for Summary Judgment, and
Memorandum of Law in Support of Summary Judgment, In re Consolidated E. coli
0157:H7 Cases, No. 00-CV-006503 (Milwaukee Cir. Ct. May 15, 2002) [hereinafter
as Excel's Memorandum].
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simple, and essentially captured the following points: (1) only USDA
(and not the States) can define what constitutes "adulterated" within
the meaning of FMIA; (2) USDA does not deem "intact products that
are to be distributed for consumption as intact products" as
"adulterated" within the meaning of FMIA if surface-contaminated
with E. coli 0157:H7; (3) the Excel meat contaminated with E. coli
0157:H7, which caused the outbreak that gave rise to the present
lawsuit, were intact cuts of meat when distributed; and therefore, (4)
Wisconsin state law is preempted to the extent that it treats as
"adulterated" what USDA, as the agency charged with interpreting
FMIA, has decided not to so treat.
The argument that Wisconsin law was preempted was supported
by a lengthy discussion of express preemption, based primarily on a
Michigan Court of Appeals case, Boulahanis v. Prevo's Family
Market,1"9 and the critical need for national uniform standards and
deference to the USDA's determination that E. coli 0157:H7 was not
an adulterant when present on meat that was intact at the time it left
the federally-inspected establishment. 141 Summarizing its position,
Excel hit all the points the Meat Industry would emphasize
throughout the litigation. It wrote:
Given the importance of preserving the integrity of our national
food supply, the federal government has spent decades
developing extensive regulations and uniform national standards
governing every aspect of the production and distribution of meat
in interstate commerce ....
The uniform national standards governing the production of raw
meat expressly provide that whole-intact meat containing E. coli
may be distributed for consumption in interstate commerce. This
is because, although pathogenic bacteria (such as E. coli) occurs
naturally in the production of meat (and is virtually impossible to
avoid, safe food-handling readily destroy the bacteria. Instead of
requiring meat producers to do the impossible (by completely
eliminating pathogenic bacteria), the federal government relies
on the end-user to follow safe food-handling practices to avoid
the dangers associated with raw meat.'41
139. 583 N.W.2d 509, 512 (1998) cert. denied 530 U.S. 1203 (2000) (holding
ground beef containing E. coli 0157:H7 was not defective under state law because
USDA had not declared it an adulterant under FMIA).
140. Excel Memorandum, supra note 138, at 2-3.
14 1. Id. at i-ii.
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In short, according to Excel and its Meat Industry cohorts, the
federal government affirmatively authorized the distribution of meat
contaminated with E. coli 0157:H7, and provided that it was the
consumer's responsibility to ensure the safety of the meat consumed.
The plaintiffs argued that (1) the Non-Intact Meat Policy
Statement was an interpretive rule that could not preempt state law,
(2) there was a question of fact whether the tri-tips implicated in the
Sizzler outbreak were non-intact meat within the meaning of Agency
policy, and (3) the court owed no deference to a policy that
irrationally treated non-intact meat further processed in a federally-
inspected establishment different than that further processed at
retail (like that which happened at the Sizzler restaurant).,12 The
latter argument was premised on the notion that USDA could not,
within the authority delegated to it, interpret the meaning of
"adulterated" under FMIA in a way that was inconsistent with the
intent of the Act to protect the public from unsafe and unwholesome
meat.'43
D. The Trial Court Grants Excel Summary Judgment on all Claims
The order granting Excel's Summary Judgment Motion was
signed and filed on May 15, 2002.144 The circuit court granted
summary judgment because it agreed with Excel that Congress had
delegated to the USDA the exclusive role of determining when meat
is safe and unadulterated.'45 Moreover, the court found that, in its
Non-Intact Meat Policy Statement, USDA had determined that
"intact meat containing surface E. coli 0157:H7 bacteria should not
be considered adulterated under federal law because the bacteria is
destroyed when the surface of the intact cuts are broiled in
142. Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, In re Consolidated E. coli
0157:H7 Cases, No. 00-CV-006503, at x-xiv, and 10-18 (Milwaukee Cir. Ct., May 15,
2002).
143. Id. at 18 and n.22 (stating that "even if the FSIS had intended to issue such a
policy [as that alleged by Excel], and assuming arguendo that it has the legal
authority to do so, this [c]ourt would be bound to reject it") (emphasis in original).
144. In re Consolidated E. coli 0157:H7 Cases, No. 00-CV-006503 (Milwaukee Cir.
Ct. May 15, 2002) (granting summary judgment dismissing all claims).
145. Id. at 2 (noting that "[p]art of the USDA's job is to determine when meat is
'safe, wholesome, and not adulterated."') (quoting Armour & Co. v. Ball, 468 F.2d
76, 81 (6th Cir. 1972)).
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establishments like Sizzler's Steak House."'4 6 This meant that the
plaintiffs were barred from bringing a civil suit against a meat
processor like Excel because "Congress has expressly preempted the
states from establishing meat standards different from federal
ones."'147  Consequently, the court concluded that the express
preemption provision in the FMIA "overcomes any state law to the
contrary."'141 Explaining its conclusion, the court stated the
following:
The policy behind preemption in this area makes sense. Excel's
processing plant is an "official establishment" governed by the
Federal Meat Inspection Act. The federal government has acted
in this area to provide national standards so that properly
handled and cooked meat products are safe for human
consumption. These standards protect the meat processors also,
so that they know what is expected of them in regard to their
products that are distribute[d] among the many states. In an area
of such great national concern, it is essential that the rules be
uniform. Federal inspectors are in these meat plants, testing the
meat and monitoring the processing programs of companies like
146. Id. (citing 64 Fed. Reg. 2803, 2804 (1999)). The court went on to quote the
Non-Intact Meat Policy Statement to the effect that "[i]ntact steaks, and other cuts of
muscle with surface contamination are customarily cooked in a manner that ensures
that these products are not contaminated with E. coli 0157:H7 when consumed."
Id. The court did not address, however, the fact that the case did not involve
persons injured by the consumption of surface-contaminated meat. Thus, like
USDA, the court ignored the implications of the risk of cross-contamination on the
determination of whether meat should be deemed adulterated. One can only
speculate whether the court's approach might have differed if Excel had been the
only available defendant. The court suggested as much at the end of its decision
when it wrote that "[i]t is important to note that this decision does not deny the
plaintiffs their day in court. They may continue against the restaurant whose
employees handled the food as well as against the restaurant's national franchisor,
who is alleged to have improperly trained and supervised its local franchisee." Id. at
3.
147. Id. at 2. As quoted by the court, the FMIA preemption clause reads in
pertinent part:
Requirements ... with respect to premises, facilities and operations of any
establishment . . . which are in addition to, or different than those made
under this chapter may not be imposed by any State ... Marking, labeling,
packaging, or ingredient requirements in addition to, or different than,
those made under this chapter may not be imposed by any State ...
21 U.S.C. § 678 (2000).
148. In re Consolidated E. coli Cases, No. 00-CV-006503, at 2 (citing Boulahanis, 583
N.W.2d at 511-12).
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Excel. The federal regulatory scheme is so long-standing and so
comprehensive that I conclude it preempts any state laws to the
contrary. That includes bringing civil suits against meat
processors like Excel.' 49
To call the trial court's ruling on Excel's motion for summary
judgment a clear victory for the Meat Industry would, by any
measure, be an understatement. This victory would prove short-
lived, however. The Court of Appeals proved a much more skeptical
audience.
E. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals Reverses:
Reopening the Courthouse Doors
In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to
Excel, the Court of Appeals first set forth the most important fact,
and defined the issue before it:
In July of 2000, a number of persons were injured and three-year
old Brianna Kriefall died from eating food that everyone party to
this appeal, the plaintiffs, Sizzler USA, and Excel, recognize was
cross-contaminated by E. coli 0157:H7 bacteria from meat sold
by Excel. Although some of the parties' arguments on appeal
focus on both to what extent the E. coli contamination was a cause
of Brianna's death and the other injuries, and whether Excel was
either negligent or sold a dangerously defective product, the only
issue we need decide on this appeal is whether the claims against
Excel are preempted by federal law.' 5 °
The court then announced its decision "that federal preemption
does not close the doors of Wisconsin's courts to the claims against
Excel."'
5'
After summarizing the basics of preemption analysis, the court
turned to the question of whether state tort claims were
"requirements... with respect to premises, facilities and operations"
within the meaning of FMIA's preemption clause.'52 Instead of
answering the question, however, the court "assume[d], without
deciding, that the word 'requirements' encompasses state common-
149. Id. at 2-3.
150. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 421.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 422-23 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 678).
[VOL. 1:375
AN EXAMINATION OF USDA RULEMAKING
law claims, although the law on this is not yet entirely settled.' ' 53
The court noted that the United States Supreme Court in Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr 54 had failed to resolve the question, even though some
courts incorrectly referred to Justice Steven's plurality opinion,
rejecting the view "that any common-law cause of action is a
'requirement' which alters incentives and imposes duties 'different
from, or in addition to,"' the applicable federal standard, as having
stated the view of the Court. 55
The court continued its analysis, as it should have, by addressing
"Congressional intent concerning the interstate sale of meat." ''6
Noting that Congress had intended FMIA to accomplish more than
one thing, the court concluded that the "overriding congressional
purpose is ... public-safety-as evidenced by not only the section's
direct statements to that effect but also by one of the stated
rationales underlying the concurrent congressional desire to
preserve fair competition for those who sell wholesome and properly
packaged and labeled meat."' 57
Having identified public safety as the primary purpose of FMIA,
the court next turned to its preemption analysis. First, it noted that
FMIA did not have an "all-encompassing clause" that delegated to
the Secretary authority to make such rules and regulations necessary
to carry out the provisions of the Act.' The court therefore
concluded that:
[A]lthough the Secretary has a wide berth in implementing the
congressional mandate to inspect meat-processing plants, the
153. Id. at 422 n.3. The court also assumed, without deciding, that if the "claims
asserted here against Excel would, if successful, affect Excel's 'operations' by
encouraging Excel to change those 'operations' in order to avoid future liability
caused by E. coli contaminated meat." Id. at 423 n.3. This assumption is only true,
however, if one also assumes that the change made to the operation would be
intended to improve the safety of the meat produced, because that would be the
only way to avoid future liability. As is discussed in Section IV, effecting such
improvements is a strong argument against preemption because civil lawsuits are an
important incentive for food safety innovation and investment.
154. 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (holding that, absent an express congressional statement
to the contrary, federal law did not preempt general common law duties).
155. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 422 n.3.
156. Id. at 423 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 602).
157. Id. at 424.
158. See id. at 424. "In contrast to some other delegations of authority by
Congress to administrative agencies, Congress's delegation here is focused." Id. at
425.
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Secretary has only limited authority to affect the congressional
definition of "adulterated," other than in the area of labeling (21
U.S.C. § 601(m)(5), (7)-(9)). And that limitation ... is critical in
this case because of Excel's argument that the Secretary views
intact meat contaminated with [E. coli] 0157:H7 as not
"adulterated." 59
The question then became whether the Secretary's treatment of E,
coli 0157:H7-contaminated intact meat as not "adulterated" was
consistent with the Congressional definition of the term and the
intent of FMIA.
Answering this question, the court noted that the "[E. coli] strain
that killed Brianna and made others sick is a 'deleterious substance
which may render [meat] injurious to health.' There is no dispute
about this."'' 60  It further noted that meat is, by definition,
"adulterated" if it "bears or contains" E. coli 0157:H7-a deleterious
substance. 6 ' This meant, the court said, intact meat contaminated
with E. coli 0157:H7 is "adulterated" within the meaning of FMIA
even if it "can be rendered non-'injurious to health' by cooking
thoroughly.' 62
The court also rejected Excel's contention that it was legally
significant that the meat arrived at the Sizzler restaurant as intact
cuts of meat and that the boxes containing the meat bore warning
labels. 6 ' As the court pointed out, Excel was required by the
HACCP Final Rule to consider "the intended use or consumers of
the finished product.' ' 164 In the case of the Sizzler outbreak, it was
the intended use of the meat products-i.e., the cutting and
mechanically-tenderizing of the meat into steaks-that was said to
have been the cause of the outbreak.'6 5 Therefore, it could not be
said that the presence of E. coli 0157:H7, even on the surface of the
meat, complied with the regulations Excel had invoked as the basis
for preemption. 66 In other words, you could not use a regulatory
159. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 425.
160. Id. at 425 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(l) (emphasis and bracketed material in
original).
161. See id. at 426.
162. Id. (emphasis in original).
163. Id. at 428.
164. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 428 (citing 9 C.F.R. § 417.2(a)(2)).
165. See Final Report, supra note 7, at 13.
166. See Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 428 (stating that "to be able to determine the
adequacy of their [hazard-analysis] plans, establishments that produce intact beef
products need to determine whether their products will be used to produce raw,
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standard to preempt a state tort claim based on it if you had not, in
fact, complied with the standard.
Despite reaching a point in its analysis that might have by itself
been dispositive of the issue, the court continued to conduct an
exhaustive analysis of the USDA's adoption and implementation of a
HACCP-based inspection system to determine if the fact of such
inspection impliedly preempted the plaintiffs' claims.1 67 The court
began by stressing that FSIS had "delegated to the meat processors
themselves the responsibility of coming up with procedures . . .
adapted to the processors' own circumstances, to safeguard the
wholesomeness of the meat they produce.""16 This fact alone belied
Excel's assertions that preemption was necessary to preserve
uniform, national regulations. As the court stated:
[I]nsofar as the preemption doctrine implicates a federal need for
uniformity of regulation .. . the federal inspection scheme here
eschews uniformity in favor of non-uniform plant-by-plant Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control plans developed by the plant
operators themselves. Simply put, rather than a nation-wide
uniform, one-size-fits-all approach present in so many
preemption cases, the Food Safety and Inspection Service now
lets meat processing plants monitor themselves with only
comparatively minimal federal oversight.169
In the absence of a countervailing need for uniformity, the court
concluded that "a claim premised on damages resulting from the
sale of 'adulterated' meat," in the words of Medtronic, "merely
provides another reason for manufacturers to comply with identical
existing 'requirements' under federal law.'
170
non-intact product.") (quoting E. coli 0157:H7 Contamination of Beef Products, 67
Fed. Reg. 62,325, 62,329 (Oct. 7, 2002)). How USDA expects establishments to
make this determination has never been explained, given that, except for product
being sent to another federal establishment for further processing, intact meat
products could presumably end up anywhere for further processing. Of course, with
regard to subprimals, like the tri-tips implicated in the Sizzler outbreak, which
average three to five pounds each, one might always safely assume that further
processing of some kind is going to occur.
167. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 429-33.
168. Id. at 429.
169. Id. at 435 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
170. Id. at 434 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 495). Accord Bates et al. v. Dow
Agrosciences, 544 U.S. _, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1802 (2005) (holding that state law tort
claims were not preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA), and finding that "[p]rivate remedies that enforce federal misbranding
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Finding that USDA had used its delegated power to declare E.
coli 0157:H7 as an adulterant per se in all raw meat products, and
that it "consider[ed] an acceptable reduction for E. coli 0157:H7 to
be a reduction to an undetectable level," 1 71 the court rejected Excel's
argument that USDA authorized it to distribute contaminated meat
just because the meat was intact at the time it left its meat-processing
facility. In doing so, it deferred to the USDA's recognition of the
"intolerable public health problem"1 7 posed by E. coli 0157:H7, and
the fact that if its "presence can be prevented, no amount of
temperature abuse, mishandling or under-cooking can lead to
foodborne illness., 171 What the court called the USDA's zero-
tolerance policy for E. coli 0157:H7 was therefore upheld-much to
Excel's displeasure. 4
F. Attacking the Kriefall Decision and Seeking to Overturn It
The Meat Industry pulled out all the stops seeking to have the
Kriefall decision overturned, first petitioning the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, and then the United States Supreme Court. It cannot be said,
of course, that this denial of further review is an affirmative
upholding of the Court of Appeal's analysis, since factors other than
the correctness of a ruling can dictate whether review is granted.1
7
1
requirements would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the functioning of FIFRA").
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens, in terms plainly applicable to the Meat
Industry's position in Kriefall, criticized the defendant for "greatly overstat[ing] the
degree of uniformity and centralization that characterizes FIFRA." Kriefall, 665
N.W.2d at 434.
171. Id. at 432 (citing Contamination of Beef Products, 67 Fed. Reg. 62,325,
62,329 (Oct. 7, 2002) (codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 419)).
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing HACCP Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,962).
174. Whether there is a zero-tolerance policy for E. coli 0157:H7 is arguably open
to question, but only because USDA utterly fails to speak clearly on the subject. If
forced to, USDA very likely might state that it does not have a zero-tolerance policy
for E. coli 0157:H7 on all meat products. That the court in Kriefall nevertheless
managed to ably build the case for the existence of a zero tolerance E. coli 0157:H7
policy "concomitant" with "what the agency called 'zero tolerance' for fecal
contamination," Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 435, should be proof enough that Agency
policy is far from sufficiently clear.
175. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 809.62(1) ("Supreme Court review is a matter ofjudicial
discretion, not of right, and will be granted only when special and important
reasons are presented."). Excel sought review from the Wisconsin Supreme Court
on two bases: that the case presents a "significant question of federal preemption,"
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However, the Kriefall decision was not overturned, and to that
extent, its holding and analysis now stand as precedent in Wisconsin,
ans as persuasive authority elsewhere. The same thing cannot be
said of the arguments made by the Meat Industry, all of which were
rejected, and which can be summarized as follows.
1. The FMIA's Preemption of State Law is Well-Settled, and
USDA's Power to Promulgate Adulteration Standards is Virtually
Unlimited
The Meat Industry claimed that "courts interpreting [FMIA]
have concluded that FSIS enjoys broad rulemaking authority," and
that this broad grant of authority "enables the agency to issue
uniform national standards for meat products."'76 While the Meat
Industry's position was replete with citations to case-law, including
sixteen decisions of the United States Supreme Court,'7 7 only one
cited case involved the issue of FMIA preemption of state law tort
claims, Boulahanis v. Prevo's Family Market.17  Yet, as the Court of
Appeals pointed out, the Boulahanis case was "irrelevant to our
decision.' ' 79 Additionally, no single published court opinion held
that FMIA or the rules promulgated pursuant to it preempts state
tort claims involving beef products. All of the other FMIA
preemptions cases cited by Meat Industry dealt with misbranding.8 0
and that the "court of appeals' decision conflicts with the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court and of other courts." See Petition for Review, at 4-27, Kriefall,
671 N.W.2d 849 [hereinafter Petition for Review].
176. See Petition for Review, at 21, Kriefall, 671 N.W.2d 849.
177. Petition of Review, at i-ii, Kriefall, 671 N.W.2d 849.
178. 583 N.W.2d 509 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) cert. denied 530 U.S. 1203 (2000)
(holding that FMIA preempted state claims for injuries caused by the sale of ground
beef contaminated with E. coli 0157:H7). The reliance on Bouhalanis was strange,
and almost wistful-like a fan of the Chicago Cubs consoling itself after another lost
pennant race with a reminder that the team had in fact won a World Series at least
once before. Near-nostalgically, Bouhalanis is a reminder that there was once no E.
coli 0157:H7 rule and no USDA retail sampling program.
179. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 436 (criticizing the decision for the "paucity of its
analysis" and questioning whether finding preemption in agency inaction was viable
in light of the United States Supreme Court's Sprietsma decision).
180. See Petition for Review, at 25-27 (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519 (1977) (holding that state law pertaining to the labeling by weight of packaged
foods at retail was is in conflict with, and preempted by, FMIA; see also National
Broiler Council v. Voss, 44 F,3d 740 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding California law that
regulated the use of the term "fresh" on labels for poultry was preempted by Poultry
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The only other cases cited by the Meat Industry were equally
misplaced because none of them involved FMIA section 601(m)(1),
the definition of "adulterated" at issue in the case.''
Products Inspection Act); Pacific Trading Co. v. Wilson & Co., 547 F.2d 367 (7th
Cir. 1976) (affirming without discussion the dismissal of claims in a breach of
contract action that alleged private right of action for civil damages based on
violation of several federal laws, including FMIA); Armour & Co. v. Ball, 468 F.2d 76,
88 (6th Cir. 1972) (holding that Michigan labeling requirement for sausages were
preempted because "Congress has unmistakably so ordained . . . preemptive
language provides 'marking, labeling.., or ingredient requirements"' prescribed
by the Secretary preempt this field of commerce.); American Nw. Selecta, Inc. v.
Munoz, 106 F. Supp. 2d 223 (D. Puerto Rico 2000) (holding that regulation that
required poultry inspection date to appear on federal inspection certificate was
invalid as in conflict with federal regulations on official marks and certificates);
Mario's Butcher Shop & Food Ctr. v. Armour & Co., 574 F. Supp. 653 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (discussing in dictum FMIA preemption while holding that a violation of
federal "misbranding" laws could support a claim under the Illinois Deceptive
Practices Act).
181. See Petition for Review, at 21-23, Kriefall, 671 N.W.2d 849 (citing Michigan
Meat Ass'n v. Block, 514 F. Supp. 560 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (holding that the FMIA
did not violate the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment substantive due-process rights); see
also American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953) (interpreting
road safety rules promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to
the Motor Carriers Act of 1935); Houston v. St. Louis Indep. Packing Co., 249 U.S.
479 (1919) (upholding USDA regulation prohibiting use of the term "sausage" as
false and deceptive when applied to products with added cereal in-excess of two-
percent and added-water in-excess of three-percent); Grocery Mfrs. of Am. v.
Gerace, 755 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1985) (addressing federal labeling requirements for
alternative cheese products and meat product containing them); Community
Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 749 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding USDA labeling
regulations under Section 6 1 0(d) allowing the use of mechanically de-boned meat in
processed meat food products with a label that described bone content in terms of
the calcium the product contained); Public Citizen v. Foreman, 631 F.2d 969 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (affirming district court ruling that nitrites in bacon and other cured
meats are exempt from the provisions of the FDCA); Meat Inst. v. Bergland, 459 F.
Supp. 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (denying AMI's motion for preliminary injunction to
enjoin a rule setting forth procedures for monitoring the processing of bacon and
regulating the presence of nitrosamines); Armour & Co. v. Ball, 468 F.2d 76 (6th Cir.
1972) (holding that federal ingredient standards issued by the Secretary pursuant to
Section 607(c) for sausages preempt conflicting state standards); U.S. v 1,500 Cases
More or Less, Tomato Paste, 236 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1956) (interpreting the FDCA
Section and finding that confiscated product was misbranded because it contained
levels of mold above the "tolerance levels" that FDA had set for mold pursuant to
FDCA Section 341(a)(3), which is the equivalent to FMIA section 602(3) and (4),
both inapplicable here); W. B. Wood Mfg. Co. v. United States, 286 F. 84 (7th Cir.
1923) (interpreting in a confiscation libel case the FDCA "added deleterious
substance" section and finding that confiscated product was misbranded because it
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The Congressional power that the Meat Industry invoked in its
description of FMIA is impressive; but not nearly as impressive as
the meat-inspection system it purports to describe. According to the
meat industry, "Congress specifically prohibits any meat from
leaving an official establishment until FSIS affirmatively determines
the meat is 'not adulterated."" 2  If this were only true, the
thousands of children and adults injured or killed in outbreaks
caused by contaminated meat would be a lot happier and alive.
Just as it did in the Court of Appeals, the Meat Industry tried to
sell a version of federal inspection and regulation in which each and
every meat product is closely inspected and certified safe before it
leaves the meat plant. Apparently hoping that the careful analysis of
the current HACCP-based meat inspection process in Kriefall would
be ignored, seeking further appellate review, the Meat Industry
continued to insist that USDA, in essence, runs every federally-
inpected meat processing facility in the country. This was the
primary argument rejected by the Kriefall court, however, and
probably also the reason that the meat industry's position lacked
credibility. As the Kriefall court had explained:
Effective January 26, 1998, for meat processors with more than
500 employees, the Food Safety and Inspection Service delegated
to the meat processors themselves the responsibility of coming up
with procedures, designated as a Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Point system, adapted to the processors' own
circumstances, to safeguard the wholesomeness of the meat they
produce. (citing and quoting 9 C.F.R. § 417.2(a)(1); Pathogen
Reduction, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,869.)
contained an unapproved food coloring); American Nw. Selecta, Inc. v. Munoz, 106 F.
Supp. 2d 223 (D. Puerto Rico 2000) (presenting a preemption case involving
regulation in conflict with FMIA labeling standard involving what information must
appear on federal certificate of inspection); Cook Family Foods, Ltd. v. Voss, 781 F.
Supp. 1458 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (calculating the effect of added water in determining
the labeled-weight of hams sold in California); Kircos v. Holiday Food Ctr., Inc.,
477 N.W.2d 130 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (providing a non-controlling opinion of the
Michigan Court of Appeals involving trichinosis in pork); Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc.
v. Rockland County Dep't of Weights and Measures, No. 01 Civ. 6980, 2003 WL
554796 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding in a labeling and misbranding case that the FMIA
regulations governing food label net-weight statements preempted conflicting
county regulations); Gorton v. American Cyanamid Co., 522 N.W.2d 746 (Wis.
1995) (addressing the issue of FIFRA preemption involving herbicide labeling)).
182. See Petition for Review, at 7, Kriefall, 671 N.W.2d 849 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 602)
(emphasis added).
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As further summarized by the Department in a June 2000 report
issued by its Office of Inspector General, the new program was
designed to "reverse[]" the arrangement under which "the
production of meat and poultry products was monitored at every
stage by Government employees" to a system that "allowed a
plant to monitor itself." U.S.D.A. Rep. No. 24001-3-At, at 1
(2000). Thus, the new plan, as phrased by the report, "gave
[meat] industry, not Government, the primary responsibility for
ensuring the safety of meat and poultry products."'
'83
Yet, the Meat Industry's continued insistence that FSIS controls all
aspects of its operation and guarantees that no adulterated meat
leaves its facility seems in the end to be little more than self-serving
rhetoric divorced from reality. If the Meat Industry's position was
true, there would be no need for product-recalls because no
adulterated meat would ever leave a meat-processing facility and
enter the stream of commerce.
The Meat Industry twisted language and logic in a failed
attempt to explain how E. coli 0157:H7, which is indisputably an
adulterant, is nonetheless not an adulterant if it sits only on the
surface of meat that happens to be intact at the time it leaves the
processing plant. Put another way, the Meat Industry asked us to
accept the notion that the presence of an adulterant on meat does
not make the meat "adulterated." To do so, it repeatedly invoked
word plays like "the circumstances" under which raw meat is
adulterated, and the "quantity of the poisonous" substance required
to "'ordinarily' render the product injurious."' 4 But this word play
ignores just how limited the Kriefall decision really was. Without
questioning the USDA's authority to interpret or enforce FMIA, the
court simply ruled that USDA "has only limited authority to affect
the congressional definition of 'adulterant,' other than in the area of
labeling."' 5 As the Supreme Court recently pointed out in Bates v.
Dow Agrosciences, a statute that "preempts competing state labeling
standards . . . does not, however, preempt any state rules that are
fully consistent with federal requirements," including particularly
state tort claims premised on a claim of misbranding.'
183. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 430.
184. See Petition for Review, at 9 & 11, Kriefall, 671 N.W.2d 849 (emphasis
added).
185. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 425 (emphasis added).
186. Bates, 544 U.S. at _, 125 S.Ct. at 1803.
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The Kriefal1 decision therefore gets it right by recognizing a
crucial distinction between the preemptive effect of the agency's
authority to establish uniform labels, and its authority to declare (or
not declare) a pathogen as an adulterant. This made unnecessary
any analysis of the spin that the Meat Industry was putting on the
Non-Intact Meat Policy Statement.
8 7
2. E. coli 0157:H7 as Natural, and Inevitable, to Meat
In its castigation of the Court of Appeal's decision, the Meat
Industry assumed that E. coli 0157:H7 is not an "added substance"
under FMIA.8 s But it is. Unlike the fish-bones and oyster shells that
were deleterious, but not added, pathogens can be readily
distinguished. Cattle become infected with E. coli 0157:1H7, and it
can then spread throughout a herd, multiplying and propagating,
and infecting other cattle. 9 As infected cattle excrete feces, the E.
coli 0157:H7 contaminates the cattle's hides. 19 ° The E. coli 0157:H7
contaminating the hides, and in the feces and ingesta, then cross-
contaminate the carcasses of other animals during the production-
process. 9' There is, as a result, nothing "natural" about the
presence of E. coli 0157:H7 in meat; it is both an adulterant and a
deadly "added substance."
Ignoring the foregoing, the Meat Industry still continued to
argue that "E. coli is a natural inhabitant in the intestines of
animals... [and] cannot always be avoided."'92 But FSIS has always
disagreed with this argument and excuse, explaining that:
Several commentators, including [meat] industry groups ... were
opposed to the concept that beef that test positive for E. coli
0157:H7 be considered adulterated because the organism may
187. See Non-Intact Meat Policy Statement, 64 Fed. Reg. 2803.
188. See 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(1) (2000). The "ordinarily injurious to health"-a less
strict standard that allows for tolerance levels--only applies if the poisonous or
deleterious substance "is not an added substance." Id. (emphasis added).
189. E. coli 0157:H7 Contamination of Beef Products, 67 Fed. Reg. at 62,327.
190. Id. See also HACCP Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,837 (stating that "fecal
contamination of carcasses is the primary avenue for contamination").
191. HACCP Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,837 ("Pathogens may reside in fecal
material, ingesta, both within the gastrointestinal tract and on the exterior surfaces
of the animals going to slaughter.").
192. See Petition for Review, at 10, Kriefall, 671 N.W.2d 849 (emphasis in original).
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be inherent in raw meat and poultry when produced under
current technology.
Under FMIA, a product is "adulterated" if "it bears or contains
any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it
injurious to health; but in case the substance is not an added
substance, such article shall not be considered adulterated under
this clause if the quantity of such substance does not ordinarily
render it injurious to health .... " (21 U.S.C. 601(m)(1))
Because beef products contaminated with [E. coli] 0157:H7 are
often cooked in a manner that may not prevent illness, this
pathogen is a substance that renders "injurious to health" even
products that many consumers consider to be properly cooked.'
Therefore, the Kriefall decision was right to reject the Meat
Industry's argument in finding that the "goal of the Food Safety and
Inspection Service and the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Point plans it implements is to 'prevent' fecal contamination and E.
coli contamination-what the agency called 'zero tolerance' for fecal
contamination and the concomitant reduction of the E. coli




3. Consumer Responsibility vs. Meat Industry Responsibility:
Just Cook It
The Kriefall decision is also buttressed by the FSIS's prior
rejection of the meat industry's argument, repeated by Excel in its
Petition, that it is the consumer's responsibility to make the meat it
purchases safe to eat-a sort of caveat esor, or eater beware,
policy.'95 FSIS notes:
Several industry commentators stated that consumers should
assume more responsibility for their safety and expressed the
need for consumer awareness programs regarding the impor-
tance of cooking beef products thoroughly.
193. Recent Developments Regarding Beef Products Contaminated with E. coli
0157:H7, 65 Fed. Reg. 6881, 6884 (Feb. 11, 2000).
194. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 435 (citing 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,850; 67 Fed. Reg. at
62,329).
195. See Petition for Review, at vii, Kriefall, 671 N.W.2d 849 (stating that "the
dangers are easily avoided in intact meat through proper handling and cooking")
(emphasis in original).
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Industry can reduce or eliminate risk associated with [E. coli]
0157:H7 through various controls and interventions... that can
be incorporated into HACCP systems. Because industry has the
means to reduce or eliminate the hazard, consumers should not be
expected to assume all the responsibility for preventing
foodborne illness associated with [E. coli] O157:H7. "
The Meat Industry's caveat esor policy was thus rightly rejected by
the Court of Appeals. The Meat Industry was predictably outraged
at the court's elevation of public interest in the safety of the meat
supply over purely economic concerns. Indeed, in its amicus brief
filed with the United States Supreme Court, the Meat Industry
claimed that the court's focus is "on people's health and safety ...
blinded [it] to the other statutory objectives [of FMIA]-namely,
promoting the national market for wholesome meat and protecting
the meat industry from losses.1 97 A better "us versus them"
statement by the Meat Industry would be hard to find, the crux of
which plainly is: more death and illness is the cost of doing business,
and the cost should be borne by consumers, not the Meat Industry.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that, despite its insistence on
consumer responsibility, and its preference for consumer education
above all, the Meat Industry has impeded more than helped
providing accurate and complete information to the public. For
example, when in the wake of the Jack in the Box outbreak USDA
wanted to put warning labels that included the temperature to which
ground beef should be cooked to, the Meat Industry sued to stop
it. '9 And while the Meat Industry and USDA has stepped-up
consumer education efforts, the information continues to be either
inadequate or inaccurate. For example, consumers are told to use a
meat thermometer, but the bi-metallic coil thermometer indicated
196. 65 Fed. Reg. 6881, 6884 (emphasis added).
197. Brief of Amici Curiae, at 20, Kriefall, 541 U.S. 956 (2004) (citing 21 U.S.C. §
602) [hereinafter Brief of Amici].
198. NESTLE, supra note 21, at 77 (noting that the Meat Industry "did not want
package labels to suggest that anything might be inherently wrong with their
product."). See American Pub. Health Ass'n v. Butz, 511 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(in a divided decision, ruling that the USDA need not require warning labels with
cooking instruction on meat and poultry). For a helpful discussion of this decision,
and the USDA's support for the Meat Industry's position against warning labels, see
NESTLE, supra note 21, at 65-67. Of course, in the wake of the Jack in the Box
outbreak, the Meat Industry changes its position. Id. at 76-78. And now the Meat
Industry uses the existence of these labels to buttress its argument that it is the
consumer's sole duty make meat safe to it.
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on the USDA warning-label is ineffective and inaccurate, and using it
"can jeopardize public health, particularly the health of the young,
elderly, and immune-compromised portion of the population.' 19
And recent research continues to show that, while consumers have a
high level of concern about food safety, they do not have a
correspondingly high awareness of the practices required for safe
food production.0° Moreover, "data suggest that many consumers
are unaware that food safety problems are likely to occur in their
homes, believing that the responsibility for food safety lies instead
with food manufacturers and restaurants. 2 1
IV. AGAINST PREEMPTION: ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL
I must confess that my trust is in the jury and the tort law whose
operations I can see, rather than in an administrative body, whose
fairness and comprehensiveness I can only pray for. Preemption
by regulation is a doctrine that makes me nervous in a world of
rapidly developing technological dangers and wonders. 2
Foodborne illness remains an overwhelming problem in the
United States. The best and most recent estimate concluded that
foodborne diseases cause approximately 76 million illnesses,
325,000 hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths in the United States each
year.203 Compared to other regulated products, even those subject
to mandatory recall authority, food products cause more deaths each
199. 0. Peter Snyder, Food Temperature Variations Along The Stem Of The Bimetallic-
Coil Thermometer, 19 DAIRY FOOD ENVIRON. SANrATION (no. 7) 477, 481, 483 (1999)
("The data show that it was difficult to assess when the hamburger was done without
the use of a thermocouple.").
200. Elizabeth C. Redmond & Christopher J. Griffith, Consumer Food Handling in
the Home: A Review of Food Safety Studies, 66 J. FOOD PROTECTION (No. 1) 130, 136
(2003) (noting, for example, that responses to surveys "have shown that [forty
percent] of consumers did not know or were not consciously aware that they were
using unsafe practices").
201. Id.
202. Jack B. Weinstein, Symposium: The Restatement of Torts and the Courts, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 1439, 1442 (Apr. 2001). Mr. Weinstein is Senior Judge, United States
District Court, Eastern District of New York. Id. at 1439.
203. Paul S. Mead et al., Food-Related Illness and Death in the United States, 5
EMERGING INFECT. DIs. (No. 5) 607, 614 (1999). Also finding that unknown agents
account for eighty-one percent of foodborne illnesses and hospitalizations, and
sixty-four percent of deaths. Id. at 616.
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year than other regulated products." 4 "In fact, contaminated food
products caused more deaths each year than the combined totals of
all 15,000 products regulated by the [United States] Consumer
Product Safety Commission. "205
"Despite regulatory efforts to improve the safety of the U.S.
food supply, foodborne E. coli 0157:H7 outbreaks remain common.
Ground beef remains the most frequently identified vehicle.
'206
Thus, notwithstanding the Meat Industry's claim that allowing state
tort claims premised on FMIA adulteration standards will do
"violence to an effective and proven statutory and administrative
scheme, 20 7 there is no evidence the current scheme is either effective
or proven. In fact, there is much evidence to the contrary.208
Moreover, there is both evidence and cogent arguments
demonstrating that lawsuits can (and should) provide important and
needed feedback to the Meat Industry about the safety of its
products. 209 Such lawsuits also create needed economic incentives to
204. Jean C. Buzby et al., Economic Research Service/USDA, Product Liability and
Microbial Foodborne Illness, at 1 (AER-799 2001), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/
publications/aer799/aer799b.pdf ("Pathogen contaminated foods.., represent an
important cause of unintentional injury and death.").
205. Id.
206. Rangel et al., supra note 34, at 606.
207. Brief of Amici, supra note 197, at 20. See also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
at 3, Excel Corp. v. Estate of Kriefall, 541 U.S. 956 (2004) [hereinafter Petition for
Writ] (stating "the decision below significantly undermines an important regulatory
system"). That USDA has, in the time since the Kriefall decision upheld, continued
on with its regulatory activities without any apparent disruption or change, not even
abandoning its policies regarding E. coli 0157:H7 on intact cuts of meat, further
reveals the in terrorem nature of the Meat Industry's arguments.
208. General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry, U.S. SENATE, MEAT AND POULTRY- Better USDA Oversight
and Enforcement of Safety Rules Need to Reduce Risk of Foodborne Illnesses, GAO-02-902,
at 4, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02902.pdf. "FSIS is not ensuring
that all plants' HACCP plans meet regulatory requirements and, as a result,
consumers may be unnecessarily exposed to unsafe foods that can cause foodborne
illness."
209. Buzby et al., supra note 204, at 9 (suggesting "economic theory suggests that
foodborne illness litigation provides signals to firms to invest more in food safety,
ultimately resulting in a lower incidence of foodborne illness and an increase in
general social welfare."). But see Lassiter, supra note 66, at 417 ("civil action through
consumer lawsuits seeking monetary damages have failed to shift the cost-benefit
analysis for the [Meat Industry] enough to alter the status quo."). Professor
Lassiter's conclusion that foodborne illness litigation cannot "provide sufficient
incentive for meat producers to provide a safe meat supply to the public," is more
20051
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invest in improved food safety technology and innovation."1 That
food safety innovation is desirable should arguably go without
saying: "Widespread diffusion of food safety innovation not only
increases choice and economic efficiency, it also saves lives and
improves health .... Innovation and the adoption and diffusion of
food safety improvements will help combat foodborne illness and
improve the quality of life for all Americans." '' But innovation is
not occurring in sufficient measure to sustain further food safety
improvement given the persistence of E. coli 0157:H7 and other
deadly pathogens in our food supply.
One commentator calls the resistance to investment in food
safety innovation "the paradox of an industry committed to safety,
but also not wanting to spend the money for safety improvements
because it is perceived as unprofitable.21 This perception exists
even though the USDA Economic Research Service determined that
the annual cost to plants of HACCP compliance has increased no
asserted than proven. Accord Roots, supra note 66, at 2431-32 (criticizing Professor
Lassiter's reliance on cited authorities that do not in fact support her position, and
describing as absurd her contention that the multimillion dollar settlements that
were obtained in the Jack in the Box outbreak cases had no effect upon corporate
conduct). A complete rebuttal of Professor Lassiter's flawed analysis, including its
failure to take into account the application of strict liability to defective food cases,
and to distinguish between outbreak versus sporadic cases in the proof of causation,
must await another article.
210. See Buzby et al., supra note 204, at 9; Bates, 544 U.S. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 1802
(stating that "the specter of damage actions may provide manufacturers with added
dynamic incentives to continue to keep abreast of all possible injuries stemming
from the use of their product so as to forestall such actions through product
improvements").
211. Elise Golan et al., ERS/USDA, Food Safety Innovation in the United States:
Economic Theory & Empirical Evidence From the Meat Industry, at 2 (AER-831 Apr.
2004) (finding that while foodborne disease outbreaks spur the demand for safety
and innovation, overall the core drivers of innovation are relatively weak for food
safety).
212. Fortin, supra note 66, at 574 (proposing the enactment of a Citizen's Food
Protection Act that would, inter alia, create judicial review of administrative action
and a private right of action for even those not injured by unwholesome food to sue
to enjoin "conduct that has, or is likely to have, the effect of adulterating or
impairing the cleanliness, safety or wholesomeness or food"). Id. at 591. Without
taking a position on the need or likely efficacy of the Act in improving food safety, I
strongly agree with Mr. Fortin that "access to the courts can provide the best
solution to the risk of agency capture, inadequate government resources, and the
dilemma of the insider perspective." Id. at 587.
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more than one-third of one cent per pound, and increased the cost
of meat and poultry products less than one-percent.1
Another reason for the resistance to voluntary investment in
food safety innovation is the absence of an obvious profit-motive.
Consumers cannot detect food safety, making it difficult for a
manufacturer to market safety as a product attribute, or more
importantly, for which to charge a premium. 4 As one economic
analysis performed by USDA found:
Consumers do not have complete information about the safety of
products they buy because producers have no direct incentive to
provide this information. Since it is not clear whether consumers
can distinguish different safety levels in food products, firms may
not wish to incur the cost of providing more than the minimum
required level of safety in the food products they market.215
Consequently, except for the compelled investments required to
achieve regulatory compliance, the desire to avoid the unwanted
costs associated with the manufacture and sale of an unsafe product,
including liability for product-related injury, is the only other
remaining compelling reasonincentive for voluntary investement in
food safety innovation. 6
The resistance (or disinclination) to voluntarily invest in food
safety is highest for commodity-like products such as ground breef
213. Michael Ollinger et al., USDA-ERS, Meat and Poultry Plants' Food Safety'
Investments: Survey Findings, Summary, at iii (2004), available at http://www.ers.usda
.gov/publications/tb 1911/tb 1911 .pdf.
214. Id. at 3; Golan, supra note 211, at 6 (noting for example that consumers
cannot tell by looking at it whether ground beef contains E. coli 0157:H7). See also
Nigol Manoukian, The Federal Government's Inspection and Labeling of Meat and Poultry
Products: Is it Sufficient to Protect the Public's Health, Safety, and Welfare, 21 W. ST. U. L.
RE'. 563, 563 (1994) ("A meat inspector can't see it, smell it, or feel it. Neither can
a chef nor someone cooking hamburger on a backyard barbecue. Microbiological
contamination, the most serious public health threat to the nation's food supply,
cannot be detected by the human senses."). Of course, if the consumer is infected
there is likely to be more than sufficient evidence of the defective nature of the
product after the fact of purchase, which is to say, when it is too late to make a
difference to the consumer's choice of the product.
215. Crutchfield et al., supra note 96, at 1-2.
216. Id. See also Buzby et al., supra note 204, at 8 (noting that "[t]hese are
'negative incentives' or adverse consequences for firms responsible for selling
pathogen-contaminated food").
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and subprimals sold for further-processing at retail.21 7 Products like
these are not subject to the market incentives applicable to
manufactured products with detailed contract specification, those
that are inspected for foreign export and those that are sold under
the manufacturer's brand name.1 8 As a result, if the manufacturers
of such products could not be held financially responsible under
product liability law, the only food safety incentive left would be the
need for regulatory compliance.
Ultimately then, the argument against preemption is the
argument against letting the Meat Industry shift the costs of its
manufacturing mistakes to those injured as a result.2 9 How much to
invest to improve the safety of the manufacturing process is a cost-
benefit analysis that manufacturers have nearly always faced. While
the Meat Industry has tried to argue that the challenges it faces are
unique, and "that a failure to apply federal preemption will subject
the meat-processing industry to intractable dilemmas," 220 this
argument must be rejected, just as the court in Kiefall did, aptly
noting:
[A]II manufacturers confront difficult cost/benefit choices when
balancing expense and methods of production on one hand,
against, on the other hand, potential liability for injuries that may
be caused by their products; we see no special burden on Excel or
other meat processors beyond that faced by anyone who puts
potentially dangerous products into the stream of commerce.
221
217. Ollinger et al., supra note 213, at 14. The tri-tips that were the subject of the
Sizzler E. coli 0157:H7 outbreak, and the resulting litigation, are an example of a
subprimal.
218. Id.
219. It is not, however, just the injured person who must shoulder the costs
associated with foodborne illness. It has been shown that some costs are shifted to
parties other than the person who became ill, including health insurance companies
for those insured, including the government for those on Medicare or Medicaid,
health care providers and taxpayers for those not insured, and employers through
sick-pay and in productivity losses. Buzby et al., supra note 204, at 7 (noting that
"these cost-shifting mechanisms may reduce the economic incentives for ill
individuals to seek compensation from those responsible for causing their illness.").
The Author's experience handling foodborne illness damage claims strongly
supports the theory that in any outbreak there will be a percentage of persons who
decide that their injuries are not serious enough to justify the decision to proceed
with a claim. This decision-making process merits empirical research.
220. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 436 n.7.
221. Id.
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The Meat Industry believes itself to be unique among regulated
industries and thus entitled to its own rule on preemption. It is
difficult to dispute that the Meat Industry is not at least unique in
appearing "relentless and self-serving.
222
It is primarily through our system of tort laws that those injured
by others are compensated, and tortfeasors are forced to pay the full
social costs of their activities.228 Such liability is intended to motivate
manufacturers to use their exclusive control of information about the
manufacturing process to reduce the occurrence of product-related
accidents.2 4 In addition to the information advantage they possess
over consumers, manufacturers are afforded a deliberate choice
about the level of investment in production quality and control
processes. 25 While regulations require certain things of all USDA-
inspected establishments, including a HACCP plan, the details of
such plans, including the technologies and interventions used,
remain solely in the control of the meat industry. For example, no
one requires the meat industry to run line-speeds as fast as they
do.2 6 This was a fact not lost on the Kriefall court, which noted:
222. NESTLE, supra note 21, at 103 (commenting on a statement made by
Rosemary Mucklow, the Executive Director of the National Meat Association,
accusing USDA of proposing a change in its E. coli 0157:H7 testing policy as a
means by the White House of diverting attention from the scandal involving
President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky). The author of this article is not surprised
at Ms. Mucklow's statement having attended a USDA sponsored conference on
pathogen reduction where, during a comment period, she stood at the microphone
and said something to the effect, "if pathogens in meat is really such a problem, I'd
like to be shown where the bodies are buried." Nancy Donley, whose child died as a
result of an E. coli 0157:H7 infection caused by adulterated ground beef, offered to
show Ms. Mucklow where at least one such body was buried.
223. Weinstein, supra note 202, at 1439 (arguing that the compensatory and
inhibitory aspects of tort law are particularly important in the area of mass torts and
public nuisances).
224. 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 5.2 (3d ed. 2000). This
rationale was the one most often emphasized by Chief Justice Traynor in those early
cases holding in favor of strict product liability. See, e.g., Escola v. Cola Cola
Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1964) (Traynor, J., concurring). See also Roger
W. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN.
L. REv. 363 (1965) (setting forth Justice Traynor's rationale in favor of the
imposition of strict liability).
225. Owen, supra note 2, at 855.
226. Machado, supra note 15, at 812. "Microbes become introduced into the meat
because of fast and sloppy slaughter practices. For example, an average line speed
slaughters three hundred cattle per hour, or one cow every three seconds." Id.
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The record here demonstrates in a concrete way how the claims
asserted against Excel supplement the protection afforded by the
meat inspection program and what the Food Safety and
Inspection System has recognized are the significant limitations
of the "organoleptic examination by inspectors." Only two
federal inspectors oversee a meat fabrication area in Excel's
plants where several hundred workers daily cut the approximately
seven-foot-long, 350 pound split carcasses into some 8,000 intact
cuts of beef weighing approximately two to four or three to five
pounds each. Federal inspectors do not inspect each one of these
smaller cuts of beef. Moreover, the seven-foot-long carcasses
arrive at the fabrication area after whizzing by the Service
inspection station at a rate of one side every six seconds." 7
Thus, plainly, the fact that meat is stamped with the words
"inspected and passed" does not mean that inspection actually
occurred or that it was effective.
Defects happen and unsafe meat gets through into interstate
commerce, even with strict regulatory compliance. 2 ' No rational
policy or regulation should assume the absence of defects, while also
allowing preemption based on such an assumption. Doing so risks
leaving those injured by real defects without a remedy. As long as
one views compensatory damages as serving a cost-internalization
process, no reason exists to think that damage awards contradict a
federal safety regulation intended to protect the public health. 29
Preempting the rights of persons injured by unsafe meat based on
the legal fiction that it was not adulterated because it was "inspected
and passed" accomplishes no objective except to immunize the Meat
Industry from liability for product defects. Such preemption also
ignores that cases involving regulatory compliance generally involve
products defective in design, or defective due to inadequate
227. Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 435-36.
228. Michael, supra note 93, at 555-56 (emphasizing that in regulatory regime
based on voluntary compliance, "there will be failures, even if the program is
functioning perfectly. The relevant comparison is not to zero faults, but the results
using any alternative regulatory technique.") As such, if too many defects are
created as a result of a given regulatory technique, and the regulated entity remains
liable for defect-related damages, then that entity is more likely to cooperate further
to improve how well the regulations work.
229. Hills, supra note 76, at 35 (arguing that "compensatory damages can be
explained by the state's judgment of corrective justice that, whatever the social
benefits of some activity, the actor ought to restore person's injured by the activity
to the position that they would have occupied but for their injuries.").
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warnings.2" A company might convincingly argue that its product
information was not legally deficient because it contained all
information required by the agency that approved it. The same
cannot be said for a company that argues, as Excel did, that meat
contaminated with a deadly pathogen cannot be treated as
defective-which is to say, unsafe beyond that reasonably expected
by an ordinary consumer-under state tort law solely because it came
from a federally-inspected meat-processing facility.
Adulteration standards should therefore be viewed for what they
are-minimal safety standards. 23' To require compensation under
state law does nothing to undermine those standards. A successful
product liability lawsuit does not impose a recall on a company or
subject it to increased regulation or enforcement.232 As is the case
with strict product liability involving manufacturing defects, the
230. Richard C. Ausness, The Case For a "Strong" Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55
MD. L. REV. 1210, 1226 (1996) ("In recent years, manufacturers have argued that
tort claims should be barred by the preemption doctrine when their products
comply with applicable federal labeling and design requirements."). See also
Schwartz, supra note 102, at 1128-29 (offering cogent criticism of tort "reform"
proposals that would make compliance with federally-issued product safety
standards a complete defense to a product liability claim, and arguing that such
standards should continue to be treated as minimum, not maximum, standards of
care). See also Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as The
Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903 (1996) (arguing that
"Cipollone makes the most sense if interpreted as announcing a federal common law
rule accepting the government standards defense rather than as a true preemption
defense available in tort actions.").
231. Weinstein, supra note 202, at 1442 (claiming "administratively-determined
product safety standards . . . should merely provide minimum standards, not
supplant tort law."). See also Lisa Lovett, Food for Thought: Consistent Protocol Could
Strengthen Food Supply Security Measures, 10 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 465, 471 (2004)
(making the interesting, albeit probably over-optimistic, argument regarding the
number of pits allowed in a can of "pitted" cherries, that "in practice, USDA
standards are not as rigorous as what cautious fruit based manufacturers would
require in order to maintain their customer base, and although deemed 'pitted' by
the USDA, these manufacturers would likely further screen these cherries before
processing them."). Whether Ms. Lovett is correct in her prediction about the
cherry-processor, however, it seems safe to assume that no extra care or further
processing would be used if it was certain that the USDA standards preempted state
tort claims and there was no risk of being held liable for injuries caused by a pit in
"pitted" cherry.
232. The author is unaware of any food recall ever prompted by the filing of a
lawsuit. Lawsuits follow recalls and foodborne illness outbreaks; they do not
precede them.
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defect in the product represents a departure from its specification,
and it is this departure for which the manufacturer is held strictly
liable.33 By continuing to allow the Meat Industry to be held liable
for the injuries caused by meat made unsafe because of a processing
defect, the Agency is doing what courts and modern tort law have
long done-making a tortfeasor pay for the damages it caused as a
result of its failure to use the care necessary to avoid creating the
defect that caused the injury.
Given the chaos involved with preemption analysis, and the
Agency's proclivity for ambiguous policy statements and sudden
policy-changes in the face of public outrage or political pressure,
regulatory preemption of state tort laws is likely to be no more
uniform than what exists at present. Consequently, the goal of
uniformity is not in conflict with the purpose of protecting the public
health, but a policy of implied preemption is. "Court decisions on
preemption are inconsistent and appear to have little predictive
value." '234
An explanation for such inconsistency may rest with the fact that
too often regulatory silence will be ambiguous and even close
scrutiny of the regulatory history may not reveal a clear answer. A
recent General Accounting Office study of several health and safety
agencies found that the basis for regulatory decisions frequently was
unclear. Because agencies do not intend or expect their regulations
to be used to define tort liability, it is unsurprising when these
regulations are not drafted in ways that assist the court. 35 Agencies
should expect though, especially USDA in light of the decision in
233. Strict liability exists in some form in all fifty states. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY 1 (1998). Not all states, however, call it strict liability.
For example, in Michigan, such liability is still treated as a form of implied
warranty. See, e.g., Vincent v. Allen Bradley Co., 291 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1980) (holding
that a breach of implied warranty is established on proof of injury caused by a defect
in the product, attributable to the manufacturer, that made the product not
reasonably fit for its intended use).
234. Ausness, supra note 230, at 1234 ("Thus, manufacturers who believe that
federal safety standards preempt tort liability must engage in lengthy and expensive
litigation in order to obtain an authoritative decision from the courts on the issue.
This failing greatly reduces the value of the preemption doctrine as a 'safe harbor'
for manufacturers whose products satisfy federal regulatory standards.").
235. Schwartz, supra note 102, at 1132 (footnotes omitted). While the use of
regulations to seek preemption of state tort claims may have been unsurprising at
the time of Professor Schwarz's article, it would be surprising for an agency to be
unaware of this issue now.
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Kriefall, that the meat industry intends to use its rules and policies as
a preemption defense.
Agencies charged with protecting the public should not
impliedly preempt the rights of those injured by unsafe meat to seek
compensation under state law.236 If we must accept that an agency
has the power to preempt, it should, at a minimum, accept the same
limits as those that apply to Congress, the source of its authority.
This means USDA, like Congress or any other agency, must be
accountable to the public, rather than deferential to the Meat
Industry it regulates. 2 137 It also means that the decision process must
be transparent, and the decision made that it makes be clear and
consistent.238 To-date, the E. coli 0157:H7 policy decisions made by
USDA have been none of these things.
In Kriefall, for example, the court might have avoided a direct
ruling on the scope of Agency authority by simply finding that the
Agency's policy statement was not sufficiently clear to preempt state
law that might be to the contrary.2 39 The Agency's statements
concerning intact meat and E. coli 0157:H7 had hardly been
consistent.210 By its own admission, the policy statement was part of
a continuing reassessment that was subject to subsequent change.
Indeed, since the policy statement first issued, and the appeals in
Kriefall had come to an end, the Agency has continued to do a
substantial amount of work in the area of intact versus non-intact
meat.241 Given this changing landscape, one might reasonably ask
236. See Ausness, supra note 230, at 1237-38 (discussing failures of preemption as
method of promoting product safety).
237. See Herrman, supra note 19, at 1197 ("A necessary premise to our system of
federalism is the notion that administrative rulemaking must somehow be
accountable to the American people in order to preserve a constitutionally
mandated balance in the area of preemption.").
238. See Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort
Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1997) (criticizing what she calls the Supreme Court's
"schizophrenic approach" to preemption analysis, and arguing that courts should
require an unmistakably clear intent from Congress before dismissing state tort
claims as preempted).
239. The court seemed to recognize this when it noted that "even the
Department's own regulations defining the word 'adulterated,' as opposed to its less
formal pronouncements, make no distinction between contaminated intact meat and
contaminated non-intact meat." Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 429 (emphasis added).
240. See discussion supra notes 82 & 83 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., FSIS Notice 32-05, Verification of Establishment's Reassessment of
HACCP Plans to Address Mechanically Tenderized Beef Products (June 1, 2005)
(stating that the reassessment was necessary because of "three recent outbreaks of
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on what basis a state tort claim should be dismissed with prejudice if,
at some later point in time, the regulatory position that formed the
basis of the dismissal is reversed. Accordingly, it makes little sense to
premise a preemption decision on policy that is in anyway unclear
evolving, or otherwise subject to possible future change.
Finally, if the Agency believes that its effective regulation
requires the preemption of state tort claims premised on FMIA, then
it should make its case public and go about the task of issuing a final
rule on the subject. Early statements by the Agency indicated that
the HACCP Final Rule was not intended to have any preemptive
effect. The Agency stated that an "establishment's liability to civil
lawsuits should not be adversely affected by this rule precisely
because it is an establishment's process, not individual lots of
product, that is being assessed, for inspection purposes, on the basis
of this testing." '42 Since then, however, the Agency has been silent
on the issue of preemption, despite the high profile efforts of the
Meat Industry to use its E. coli 0157:H7 policy, among other things,
to obtain immunity from civil lawsuits. "The door is wide open for
federal agencies to exert far greater influence on the preemption
question. '  The Agency should therefore speak up, and do so
clearly, on this issue. Clarity may not stop the Meat Industry's
efforts to immunize itself from liability for the harm caused by
unsafe meat, but it will at least make the effort less likely to succeed.
V. CONCLUSION
In enacting FMIA, Congress intended "to protect the
consuming public from meat and meat food products that are
adulterated or misbranded and to assist in efforts by State or other
Government agencies to accomplish this objective."2" The goal of
disease from [E. coli 0157:H7] associated with the consumption of mechanically
tenderized beef.") One of the outbreaks mentioned was the Sizzler outbreak.
242. HACCP Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,806, 38,854. The Kriefall court did
not give this statement any weight, and it was not the basis of its decision. The court
noted, however, that "it is far from settled that an agency's view of the preemptive
effect of a statute is given any deference." Kriefall, 665 N.W.2d at 437 (emphasis in
original).
243. Scott A. Smith & Duana Grage, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability
Actions, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 391, 416 (2000). Smith and Grage state that "the
preemption defense is almost certain to remain highly politicized." Id. at 415.
244. 21 U.S.C. § 661 (2000).
[VOL. 1:375
AN EXAMINATION OF USDA RULEMAKING
the Agency should be to enact regulations that result in the removal
of pathogens from the meat supply, farm to table. The fact that this
is a difficult goal to fully achieve is no reason to change it. Agency
policy making regarding the issue of E. coli 0157:H7 has been a
case-study in reactionary rulemaking and agency capture. The
Kriefall decision makes plain that the Meat Industry intends to use
preemption to try to create de facto uniform standards that will
endanger the public while leaving people injured by unsafe meat
without a remedy.
To avoid such a result, the Agency should provide a clear
directive on the subject of preemption, while also changing course
on its E. coli 0157:H7 policy. Only a zero-tolerance policy for E. coli
0157:H7 applied to all meat will achieve Congress' objective. The
court in Kriefall found that such a zero-tolerance policy currently
exists, but the USDA's conflicting and ambiguous statements on the
subject call the existence of such policy into serious question. Until
we fully understand this decidedly deadly pathogen, there is simply
no room for error in protecting the public. We should therefore
commit ourselves and the resources of our government to ensuring
that E. coli 0157:H7 never contaminates meat of any kind, any
quantity, and in any way.
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